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Abstract 
 The long-running debate about whether judges have adequate resources has begun to 
boil. State and federal legislatures are slashing court budgets, with many courts receiving 
up to twenty percent reductions. In recent years, judges have been resigning or retiring in 
droves. The resulting judicial vacancies are often left unfilled. Those judges that remain will 
be forced to spend considerably less time on each case. 
 In response to this impending crisis, scholars have just begun systematically and 
empirically to consider how resource limitation affects judging. These studies are of vital 
importance, not only because they are so topical, but also because they have found evidence 
of a potential link between the amount of resources that appellate judges have and the 
likelihood that they will be deferential to the lower courts or to their colleagues. For 
example, a reduction in available resources correlates with lower reversal rates. 
 Because this academic movement is in its infancy, however, its techniques and findings 
leave plenty of room for growth. While scholars have examined how resource limitation 
affects case outcomes, they have yet to focus on how it impacts the reasoning and convictions 
of the judges, themselves. Does it make judges more or less likely to follow the 
straightforward dictates of the law? Does it affect judges’ beliefs that they have reached 
righteous outcomes? These are pivotal concerns for those in control of court budgets and 
personnel. If judges are able to do their jobs as well or better with less and they are willing 
to accept less, then cutting budgets could very well be a wise savings measure. If judges 
make more errors or become so dissatisfied that they no longer want to continue, then 
stripping courts of resources could be very dangerous, if not destructive. 
 Here, I use behavioral experimentation to elucidate how the amount of time available to 
decide a case could affect the likelihood that the judge in that case will straightforwardly 
apply the law. Using a judicial simulation with law students at three law schools, I 
uncovered evidence that reducing resources increases the likelihood of straightforward 
application. Before budget cutters rejoice, however, I also discovered evidence that 
enhancing legal constraint in this way comes with a cost—namely, a significant reduction 
in judges’ convictions that they have reached righteous outcomes. The results here support 
the idea that boosting legal constraint in this way might increase judge discontent, perhaps 
exacerbating the problem of bench vacancies. 
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I. INTRODUCTION
 This is an era of austerity for the courts. Last year, forty state 
court budgets were cut, some receiving twenty percent reductions.1
Twenty-nine state court systems have had their budgets slashed so 
far this year.2 Over a dozen courts have shortened hours of 
operation.3 Judicial pay is frozen or lagging.4 As a result, many 
judges are seeking greener pastures. The New York Times recently 
reported that, “[n]ow, for the first time in memory, judges are leaving 
the bench in relatively large numbers—not to retire, but to return to 
being practicing lawyers.”5 The state courts of New York have been 
among the hardest hit: nearly one in ten judges are now leaving 
annually, twice the number from a decade earlier.6 Compounding the 
 1.  Richard Y. Schauffler & Matthew Kleiman, State Courts and the Budget Crisis: 
Rethinking Court Services, in THE BOOK OF THE STATES 289, 289 (Council of State 
Government ed., 2010). 
 2.  William Glaberson, Cuts Could Stall Sluggish Courts At Every Turn, N.Y. TIMES,
May 16, 2011, at A1. 
 3.  Id.
 4.  William Glaberson, Pay Frozen, More New York Judges Leave Bench, N.Y. TIMES,
July 5, 2011, at A1. 
 5.  Id.
 6. Id.
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strains caused by these absences are failures to fill empty seats. 
Vacancies have reached “crisis” levels in the federal courts.7
Specifically, one-half of the federal bench will be unoccupied within 
ten years if confirmation rates do not improve.8 Judges have more to 
do, and they must do it with less. 
 We must now answer a grave question: what happens to judging 
when the judges are stripped of resources?  
 The relationship between resources and judging has been 
considered before,9 often by the judges themselves.10 Unsurprisingly, 
judges paint an unflattering portrait of resource restriction, one of 
ideological influence, limited access, and dwindling justice.11 Chief 
Justice of the California Supreme Court, Tani Cantil-Sakauye, 
recently claimed that proposed budget cuts would “strike[ ] a blow 
against justice” and endanger judges’ ability to provide “fundamental 
services.”12 Similarly, Chief Justice of the Massachusetts Supreme 
Judicial Court, Margaret Marshall, recently claimed that inadequate 
funding could eliminate judicial independence.13 Federal judges echo 
this sentiment. In 2006, Chief Justice Roberts contended that, if 
judicial appointment “becomes a stepping stone to a lucrative 
position in private practice, the Framers’ goal of a truly independent 
judiciary will be placed in serious jeopardy.”14 This past year, he set 
his sights on judicial vacancies, describing them as one of the main 
obstacles to “maintenance of the public trust.”15
 7.  See Press Release, Democratic Policy Committee, Fact Sheet: Judicial Vacancy 
Crisis (Feb. 7, 2011), available at http://dpc.senate.gov/dpcdoc.cfm?doc_name=fs-112-1-4.  
 8.  Id.
 9.  For an early example of academic analysis, see Charles Alan Wright, The 
Overloaded Fifth Circuit: A Crisis in Judicial Administration, 42 TEX. L. REV. 949,  
949 (1964). 
 10. See, e.g., Henry J. Friendly, Averting the Flood by Lessening the Flow, 59 CORNELL
L. REV. 634, 642 (1974); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Reflections on the Independence, Good 
Behavior, and Workload of Federal Judges, 55 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 7-13 (1983); Lewis F. 
Powell, Jr., Are the Federal Courts Becoming Bureaucracies?, 68 A.B.A. J. 1370, 1371 
(1982); Judith S. Kaye, Op-Ed., Free Judges’ Pay, N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 2007, at A35, 
available at 2007 WLNR 10573173 (Chief Justice of New York Court of Appeals calling for 
pay increase because lack thereof threatens “cherished liberties”). 
 11. See Kaye, supra note 10. 
 12.  Shane Goldmacher, Chief Justice: “Crippling” California Court Cuts Would Be a Blow 
Against Justice, L.A. TIMES, June 14, 2011, http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/california-politics/ 
2011/06/chief-justice-crippling-california-court-cuts-would-be-a-blow-against-justice-.html.  
 13.  Chief Justice Margaret H. Marshall, President, Conference of Chief Justices, 
Remarks at the American Bar Association House of Delegates (Feb. 16 2009), available at
http://www.ncsconline.org/D_Comm/ThisWeek/Marshall_remarks_021609.pdf. 
 14.  CHIEF JUSTICE JOHN G. ROBERTS, JR., 2006 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL
JUDICIARY 6 (Jan. 1, 2007), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/year-end/ 
2006year-endreport.pdf. 
 15.  CHIEF JUSTICE JOHN G. ROBERTS, JR., 2010 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL
JUDICIARY 4-5 (Dec. 31, 2010), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/ 
year-end/2010year-endreport.pdf. 
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 Responding to the growing sense of dread, legal academics have 
begun to analyze the issue of resource restriction with renewed vigor 
and improved empirical methodologies. Using published court data 
such as judicial opinions, these empiricists have compared the 
behavior of judges that have more resources, such as higher salaries 
or more time to decide cases, to those that have less.16 A tentative 
answer is beginning to emerge, and the most fascinating part is that 
it is different from, and arguably more palatable than, the one that 
the judges have given: judges respond to limited resources by 
becoming more deferential to lower courts and less ideological.  
 Indeed, recent studies have provided evidence that judges are less 
likely to reverse lower court decisions17 and to vote for outcomes that 
are consistent with their political ideologies when they are busy18 and 
that they are more likely to be independent19 and productive20 when 
they give up more money to take the job. While these studies focus 
upon myriad dimensions of judging—and I detail their methodologies 
and findings below—these aspects of their research in particular 
have contributed to a growing divide between academics and judges 
on this issue of appropriate resources. Professor Eric Posner, a 
coauthor of one such study, recently stated “[t]he absence of [salary] 
raises is a problem only if judges weren’t overpaid to begin with.”21
 Should society fight against court budget cuts? Should it embrace 
them? As the preceding discussion suggests, the question of whether 
judges are adequately resourced turns in large part on how the 
availability of resources affects the quality of judging.  
 Determining the quality of a judge’s decision in a case is an 
activity fraught with subjectivity.  Unsurprisingly, existing empirical 
studies leave us wondering whether deferential and counter-
ideological voting constituted good judging in those cases. 
Fortunately, debates about what makes good judging tend to focus on 
two distinct phenomena—what I call here “straightforward” and 
 16.  See, e.g., Bert I. Huang, Lightened Scrutiny, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1109, 1116-33 
(2011) (comparing circuit courts with suddenly high docket loads to those with normal 
docket loads). 
 17.  Id. at 1127-33. 
 18.  William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Rational Judicial Behavior: A Statistical 
Study, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 775, 820-24 (2009) (comparing frequency of counter-ideological 
voting by judges in Circuit Courts to those in Supreme Court). 
 19.  Stephen J. Choi, G. Mitu Gulati & Eric A. Posner, Are Judges Overpaid? A 
Skeptical Response to the Judicial Salary Debate, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 47, 96 (2009) 
(measured by proportion of dissents against judges appointed by the same party and 
controlled for court composition, the more often they dissented against their own party’s 
judges, the more independent).  
 20.  Scott Baker, Should We Pay Federal Circuit Judges More?, 88 B.U. L. REV. 63, 66 
(2008) (measured by time it took judges to file published opinions after hearing  
oral argument). 
 21.  Glaberson, supra note 4. 
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“indirect” adjudication—the identification of which can be done 
without sacrificing objectivity.  In the remainder of the Introduction, 
I will briefly explain what these terms mean, how they figure in the 
debate about what makes for good judging, and how they can be  
studied empirically.  
 For a judge to have the option of engaging in either 
straightforward or indirect adjudication, the case before her must 
involve the interpretation of an authoritative legal norm, the face of 
which makes a dispositive directive readily apparent. When a judge 
has chosen to follow that directive, he or she has engaged in 
straightforward adjudication. When a judge has chosen not to, he or 
she has engaged in indirect adjudication. 
 It is widely believed that law is valuable largely because it has the 
capacity to force judges to reach the outcomes that are called for 
under straightforward adjudication even when the judges would 
prefer not to. This is a central example of a more general concept 
known as legal “constraint.” Law is constraining when judges 
experience that the law forces them to choose in ways that are  
at odds with the way that they would have chosen in the absence  
of law.22
 Many believe that straightforward adjudication, when possible, is 
the best or even the correct way to resolve a legal dispute.23 The 
higher the likelihood that judges will be constrained under law to 
engage in straightforward adjudication, the better, or so they believe. 
One corollary of this account of law is that legal rules have the 
capacity to dictate single results in the cases to which they apply by 
providing sufficient and exclusive directives that answer disputes. 
On that account, a judge that does not engage in straightforward 
adjudication under such circumstances is acting in defiance of the 
 22. Frederick Schauer adopts a similar approach to understanding constraint 
empirically. Frederick Schauer, When and How (If at All) Does Law Constrain Official 
Action?, 44 GA. L. REV. 769, 789 (2010) (“Having arrived at what they believe to be the best 
law-independent decision, when, if at all, are officials willing to set that decision aside in 
the service of a legal constraint they believe mistaken?”). See also Mark Tushnet, Popular 
Constitutionalism as Political Law, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 991, 991 (2006) (“As law, it 
sometimes induces decision-makers to make decisions that are inconsistent with their 
‘pure’ preferences, that is, those they would hold in the absence of law.”). 
 23. See, e.g., Donald R. Songer, Danna Smith, and Reginald S. Sheehan, 
Nonpublication in the Eleventh Circuit: An Empirical Analysis, 16 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 963, 
970-71 (1989) (“If the case involves, as the criteria suggests, the straightforward 
application of clear and well-settled precedent which is not in need of any published 
explanation by the courts of appeals, then the correct decision and the correct basis of 
decision should be obvious to any person who is well trained in the law. Since federal 
district court judges are highly trained professionals, they should be expected to reach the 
correct decision in such cases and thus to have their decisions affirmed.”); Wilson v. 
Robertshaw Controls Co., 600 F. Supp. 671, 675 (N.D. Ind. 1985) ("The language of the 
statute at issue is plain and straightforward and the words, therefore, must be accorded 
their plain meaning."). 
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law. She is refusing to allow the law to constrain her. Perhaps the 
most well known proponent of this account is Chief Justice Roberts, 
who famously analogized the role of the judge to the role of the 
umpire, “to call balls and strikes.”24 Others feel differently, of course, 
most notably those that believe the judicial role often calls for resort 
to equity, to law’s background morality, or to morality generally even 
when the conditions permitting straightforward adjudication are 
met.25 In other words, they argue that the correct legal outcome does 
not necessarily follow straightforwardly from a legal directive. For 
them, the complexity and robustness of law is such that it sometimes 
provides judges with circuitous, yet entirely permissible or even 
authoritative pathways that are at odds with straightforward 
adjudication.26 On this view, the law has the power to constrain, but 
the constraining directive does not always come from the face of the 
authoritative legal norm. 
 Thankfully, neither identifying constraint nor distinguishing 
between instances of straightforward and indirect adjudication 
requires the researcher to take a side in the normative aspects of the 
debate, and here I endorse neither straightforward nor indirect 
adjudication (nor, for that matter, constraint). I instead seek to shed 
light on a descriptive component of adjudication—namely, the 
likelihood that judges are willing to engage in indirect adjudication 
and whether certain conditions augment this tendency. Put 
differently, rather than aiming to answer the normative 
 24. United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 55 
(2005) (statement Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to Be 
Chief Justice of the United States) [hereinafter Confirmation Hearing] at 56.  
 25. See, e.g., Michael S. Moore, Law and Morality: Four Reflections on Law and 
Morality, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1523, 15 (2007) (“Aquinas talks of overruling the letter of 
a statute with its spirit, Fuller, of using the purpose of a statute and not its ordinary 
English semantics, Dworkin, of prioritizing a principle over a rule, and Cardozo, of saving 
the common law from rigidity in the face of changes in what Holmes called ‘the felt 
necessities of the times.’ These all come to much the same thing: a judge should use 
morality to declare the obvious law not to be what obligates either him or the citizens he 
judges, in cases where the obvious law leads to such absurd results.”); Henry E. Smith, 
Rose’s Human Nature of Property, 19 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 1047, 1050-1051 (2011) 
(espousing virtues of equity in tax avoidance context and stating, “To serve as a safety 
valve against opportunism, equity is a holistic mode of decision making that is not fully 
captured by rules versus standards.”) Cf. Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private 
Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1685, 1773-74 (1976) (discussing positive 
altruistic role that moral standards play in law); MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL 
LEGAL STUDIES 15, 38, 54-55 (1987) (same).  
 26. See Dan Simon, Freedom and Constraint in Adjudication: A Look Through the 
Lens of Cognitive Psychology, 67 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1097, 1139 (2002) (Discussing the 
various indirect adjudicatory options in relation to legal complexity and stating “It is 
important to note that the following analysis can be made of virtually any appellate case. 
Rogers is a convenient example because of its relative simplicity and brevity. This case is 
also suitable for the current purposes in that it cuts across the paradigmatic ideological 
line that divides the Court. The observations made from this case are typically more 
pronounced in longer and more complex cases.”) (citation omitted).  
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straightforward/indirect debate, I aim to provide evidence of the 
conditions that bring about the two behaviors at its heart, including 
when such behaviors exhibit law’s constraining power.  
 There are multiple ways empirically to isolate law’s (or the 
content of law’s) impact on judicial decisionmaking. One way is to 
analyze how the presence of law leads to outcomes that are at odds 
with those that judges would prefer in the absence of law under the 
same facts. Another way is to compare how different kinds of legal 
content affect judicial decisionmaking under the same facts. Still a 
third way is to combine these approaches. 
 Unfortunately, the popular empirical methodology for law’s 
impact on judicial decisionmaking does not permit any of these 
approaches. Thereunder, empiricists limit their analysis to the data 
that can be extracted from accessible court documents. Rarely (if 
ever), does the same judge or court encounter the same facts in 
multiple cases and under different legal authority or no legal 
authority at all. Instead, empiricists have mostly taken a different 
approach: they reduce judges to black boxes that take in ideological 
inputs from one end and spit out liberal or conservative case 
outcomes from the other.27 Under this approach, when data show that 
busy judges decide cases that are at odds with their ideologies more 
often than judges that have lighter workloads, the empiricists 
suppose that the busy judges have followed the law more often.28
Certainly, the black-box method has the virtue of objectivity; it 
eliminates the need to code the potentially subjective variable of 
whether the judge voted for the correct legal outcome. The resulting 
problem is obvious, however: the busy judges might have gotten their 
cases wrong or otherwise engaged in subpar adjudication.  
 Judges can vote against their ideology for any number of reasons, 
many of which are not related to the law they interpret.29 They might 
have been so rushed that they did not pay attention to the law at all. 
They might have been engaging in strategic compromises with fellow 
panel judges so that they would get a favorable result in a future case 
that is more ideologically important to them. They simply might not 
be as ideologically engaged with the case they are considering as  
the empiricists think they are. This problem of behavioral 
 27.  See discussion infra Part II. 
 28.  See Landes & Posner, supra note 18. 
 29.  The landmark law review article indicating that counter-ideological voting in 
appellate panels might not reflect a lack of ideologically-motivated strategy is Richard L. 
Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the D.C. Circuit, 83 VA. L. REV. 1717, 
1764-69 (1997); see also Burton M. Atkins, Judicial Behavior and Tendencies Toward 
Conformity in a Three-Person Small Group: A Case Study of Dissent Behavior on the U.S. 
Court of Appeals, 54 SOC. SCI. Q. 41 (1973). 
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equivalence—when different behaviors produce the same data in an 
analysis30—is a byproduct of the black-box approach. 
 This Article uses behavioral experimentation to peer into the 
black box. By eliminating the need to rely on publicly available court 
documents and instead relying on data gathered from simulations, 
we gain unprecedented control over the decisionmaking environment. 
Reliance on court documents forces empiricists to compare judges 
even though they are deciding under different precedent, for different 
cases, and with different individual workloads. Moreover, they must 
use rough, imperfect proxies to guess how those judges would prefer 
to decide the cases that are before them, such as the party of the 
president who appointed them. Behavioral experimentation, on the 
other hand, can be used to identify the outcome that the judges 
prefer in the very case that they are considering, and it allows us to 
compare only those judges that share the same preferences, all while 
controlling for the precise amount of resources that each judge has. 
In addition, using that approach in this context can teach us more 
about what the judges are thinking and, most importantly, how the 
amount of resources they have affects their thinking. We can ask 
judges to provide virtually unlimited information about their 
decisionmaking at the very moment that they are engaged in it. 
 The experimental subjects in the judicial simulations at the heart 
of this Article were law students at highly ranked schools that had 
completed approximately one year of study or more. Needless to say, 
it would have been optimal to use actual judges, but that approach 
was simply unworkable in a study such as this, which requires over 
one hundred subjects that are willing to participate in multiple 
sessions to achieve statistically significant results. Consequently, 
this study follows the commonplace practice of using graduate-level 
students to test hypotheses that concern real-life counterparts.31
 30.  See Stefanie A. Lindquist & Wendy L. Martinek, Response, Psychology, Strategy, 
and Behavioral Equivalence, 158 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 75, 76-77 (2009) (discussing 
behavioral equivalence issue in study of panel effects). 
 31.  It would be hasty to dismiss the results of this study on that ground, alone: “By 
now there is also a significant body of evidence showing how even simulation or survey 
studies using, say, college and university students—as is often the case in psychology 
experiments—typically generate results resembling those of experiments using more 
realistic participants and designs. Similarly, the results of decision-making studies using 
monetary incentives for performance largely correspond with those of psychological 
experiments, which often do not rely on financial incentives.” Avishalom Tor, The 
Methodology of the Behavioral Analysis of Law, 4 HAIFA L. REV. 237, 285-86 (2008). Indeed, 
in a nearly identical experiment, I collected data about the amount of law school education 
and also included in the subject pool those that had been law school graduates for up to two 
and a half years. There were no statistically significant differences with respect to any of 
the time-unrelated hypotheses described below between those that had graduated from law 
school and those that had only completed a half-year. See Brian Sheppard & Andrew 
Moshirnia, For the Sake of Argument, 40 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. (forthcoming May 2012). Of 
course, that does not mean that the external validity of these results cannot be scrutinized.  
2012]  JUDGING UNDER PRESSURE 939
 The results of the experiment both match and build upon those of 
earlier studies. First, like earlier studies,32 the results provide 
empirical support for the claim that limiting resources increases 
judicial deference and decreases the impact of ideology on case 
outcomes. Critically, however, the results here also support a finding 
that this result is caused by increased deference to the content of the 
law. In other words, time limitation made it more likely that subjects 
would straightforwardly follow the legal directives that applied to  
their cases.  
 While this finding is good news to those who seek to cut court 
budgets, there is bad news as well. Subjects under time limitation, 
particularly those who followed the law, experienced a considerable 
drop in the strength of their belief that they were doing the right 
thing in deciding their cases as they did.33 Meanwhile, those  
who followed the law without time limitation experienced the  
opposite effect—they felt more strongly about the righteousness of  
their decisions.34
 Thus, stripping judges of resources might strengthen the 
constraining power of the law but weaken the judges’ beliefs that 
they did the right thing when they made their decisions. Indeed,  
this interaction between restriction and conviction might explain  
why judges are leaving the bench despite being, as Posner  
says, overpaid.35
 In the following Part, I summarize the existing scholarship on the 
relationship between legal constraint and judicial resources. I further 
propose specific changes to the models of legal constraint used in 
these and other empirical studies, changes drawn from analysis and 
observation of typical judging behaviors. The remainder of the Article 
is devoted to the design and results of my empirical research. In Part 
III, I detail a revised model and explain how it has been incorporated 
into the experiment that is at the heart of this study. In Parts IV and 
V, I describe and analyze the results of the experiment. Finally, in 
Part VI, I consider the policy implications of those results and outline 
opportunities for further study.  
   
 32. See Huang, supra note 16; Landes & Posner, supra note 18; Choi, et al., supra
note 19; Baker, supra note 20. 
 33. See discussion infra Part IV.  
 34. See discussion infra Part IV & V.C. 
 35.  Glaberson, supra note 4. 
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II. CRITIQUING THE PREVAILING EMPIRICAL MODEL 
OF LEGAL CONSTRAINT
 The study of the relationship between judging and resources is the 
latest chapter of the empirical revolution in legal academia.36 The 
strengths and weaknesses of this recent work mirror the majority of 
general empirical legal studies of courts. In this Part, I first 
summarize the latest research on the interaction and then I describe 
the shortcomings that prevail in the scholarship, generally.  
A.   Recent Scholarship on Judging and Resources 
 In the last few years, there have been a handful of impressive 
studies that analyze how resources affect judicial performance. With 
respect to resources, the focus has been on two dimensions of judicial 
life—workload and salary. Each dimension corresponds to specific 
problems currently facing the judiciary. As discussed, many courts 
are shorthanded, so judges are facing higher docket loads.37 In 
addition, judicial salaries have been falling for decades (at least when 
adjusted for increased costs of living).38 It is obvious that shortages in 
either judge free time or salary could impact judging, and the 
following studies provide support. 
 1.   Significant Discoveries 
 The most impressive study that has focused on the relationship 
between workload and judging is Bert Huang’s recent analysis of the 
surge in the immigration cases that resulted from post-9/11 
deportation “streamlining.”39 Two circuits, the Ninth and Second, 
bore the brunt of the surge; most others remained largely 
untouched.40 When comparing the circuits, Professor Huang 
discovered that the Ninth and Second Circuits overruled significantly 
fewer cases than they had before, whereas the reversal rate in the 
other circuits stayed the same.41 He further showed that a similar 
reduction occurred in the Second Circuit when it experienced a 
momentary reduction in available judges a few years earlier.42
 36.  See Christina L. Boyd & David A. Hoffman, Disputing Limited Liability, 104 NW.
U. L. REV. 853, 854 n.10 (2011) (describing “empirical revolution”). 
 37.  Id.
 38.  Amanda Becker, Federal Judges Ask Supreme Court to Hear Case on Their Pay,
WASH. POST, (June 28, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/ 
06/25/AR2010062504394.html. 
 39.  Huang, supra note 16, at 1113-14. 
 40.  Id. at 1121-26. 
 41.  Id. at 1135 figs.9 & 10, 1150-52.  
 42.  Id. at 1136. 
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 In a separate study, William Landes and Richard Posner make 
similar findings through different methods.43 After a thorough 
comparison of the voting patterns between the U.S. Supreme Court 
and the U.S. Courts of Appeals, they discovered that court of appeals 
judges were more likely than Supreme Court justices to vote against 
the interests of the parties that appointed them by a margin of about 
15% for Republican appointees and 20% for Democratic appointees.44
In addition, they found that court of appeals judges were more likely 
to engage in conformist voting—voting as the predominant political 
bloc of their circuit votes.45 Landes and Posner’s study was not 
specifically designed to test the impact of resource restriction; rather, 
its primary goal was to determine whether judges exhibited economic 
rationality under the particular circumstances of their respective 
institutions.46 The reason that this study is of interest here, however, 
is that a key assumption of their empirical model is that resource 
restriction interacts with law’s constraining power.  
 In particular, Landes and Posner contend that the conformist and 
counter-ideological voting in the courts of appeals is a result of 
comparatively higher costs of writing a dissent.47 The costs are 
higher, they suppose, because the workloads of the court of appeals 
judges are heavier.48 When free time is bountiful, such persuasive 
and probably fruitless writing is not particularly costly. An increase 
in the costs of resisting the majority forces in their circuits, they 
speculate, leads the judges to follow and even value precedent more 
than their colleagues on the Supreme Court: 
Especially given leisure preference, the heavier workload in the 
courts of appeals makes the cost of a dissent greater for courts of 
appeals judges than for Supreme Court Justices. The heavier 
workload also increases the benefits of decision according to 
precedent, which greatly reduces the time and effort involved in a 
decision . . . So we can expect decision in accordance with precedent 
to be more valued in the courts of appeals. That reduces the value of 
a dissent, because the majority vote will establish the precedent 
and the dissent will usually have no influence on the law.49
 43. Landes & Posner, supra note 18. 
 44.  Id. at 823. They also adopted a tripartite system of classification: “And if we 
classify Justices as conservatives, moderates, and liberals, we found that ratio of the 
fraction of conservative votes of conservative to liberal Justices was about 2.5 times higher 
than ratio of judges appointed by Republican and Democratic Presidents in the court of 
appeals.” Id.
 45.  See id. at 821. 
 46.  See id. at 779. 
 47. Id. at 820-21.  
 48. Id.
 49.  Id. at 820-21. 
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In other words, they find that restricting resources positively 
correlates with legal constraint.  
 Rounding out the empirical analysis of judicial resources is a pair 
of studies examining the relationship between judicial pay and 
performance.50 In a similar, previous study, Scott Baker found that 
higher judicial pay neither reduced ideological decisionmaking nor 
increased the effort of judges in the U.S. Courts of Appeals.51 With 
respect to ideology, Baker analyzed whether higher pay made judges 
more likely to vote against their personal ideologies in controversial 
cases52 and whether it made them more likely to cite judges 
appointed by opposing parties as persuasive authority.53 With respect 
to effort, he analyzed whether higher pay increased dissent rates in 
controversial cases54 and whether it decreased the time it took judges 
to file published opinions after hearing oral argument.55 Not only did 
he find no evidence of these relations, he found that those who had 
greater cuts in pay when they entered the judiciary issued published 
opinions the quickest.56
 In the second study, Stephen Choi and others found that, among 
the justices of state high courts, higher salary did not correlate with 
increases in any of the positive metrics they devised, including 
productivity (measured by pages of published opinions), higher 
quality opinions (measured by out-of-state citations), or judicial 
independence (measured by proportion of dissents against judges 
appointed by the same party controlled for court composition).57 They 
even found evidence that higher salaries might make judges less 
independent; as those judges that experienced higher opportunity 
costs in choosing to be judges exhibited higher independence.58
 Looking at these studies collectively, a rather rosy picture of 
judicial resource restriction emerges. When it comes to pay, there 
seems to be no relationship between high pay and better 
performance, even considering metrics that reflect upon the judges’ 
willingness to be constrained by law. When considering workload, it 
appears that there is a positive correlation between workload and 
deference, and if Landes and Posner are right, this deference is a 
result of increased willingness to be constrained by law. 
 50.  See generally Choi et al., supra note 19; Baker, supra note 20. 
 51.  See Baker, supra note 20, at 66. 
 52.  Id. at 85-94. 
 53.  Id. at 95-98. 
 54.  Id. at 98-101. 
 55.  Id. at 101-05. 
 56.  Id. But see Christopher Zorn et al., Working Class Judges, 88 B.U. L. REV. 829, 
834, 834 tbl.1 (2008) (noting opposite correlation in top five legal markets). 
 57.  Choi et al., supra note 19, at 64-73. 
 58.  Id. at 96. 
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 2.   Limitations 
 While these studies present a potential silver lining to the dark 
cloud of forced austerity, it is important to remind ourselves that the 
relationship between resources and constraint remains an open 
question.59 One dimension of constraint that remains unstudied is of 
crucial social importance: are we seeing increased legal constraint or 
are we seeing something else? Professor Huang was keenly aware of  
this problem:  
Without a deep understanding of the case composition in each 
circuit, it would be hard to draw credible inferences from 
[differences in reversal rates between circuits]. (It could be that 
the circuit with the higher reversal rate is actually the one 
reviewing with greater deference — only, it has a higher 
concentration of reversal-prone cases.) The same goes for a single 
circuit whose reversal numbers are seen to change over time. 60
It is difficult to account for the specific role that law plays in the 
judges’ decisions, such as in their decisions not to reverse. Does the 
judge feel that the law compels affirmance, or is the judge simply 
trying to push cases off his or her desk? Has the law constrained the 
judge or not? Each of the studies described here makes progress in 
answering these questions, but their authors either were focused on 
other issues or were justifiably content to be among the first to 
identify a relationship between resources and constraint rather than 
to explore that relationship at length. 
 Professor Huang’s study, for example, does not analyze the 
content of the cases before each circuit outside of adopting their 
general subject matter as labeled by the Administrative Office of the 
U.S. Courts.61 His omission is reasonable: the goal of the study was to 
isolate the effect of workload on reversal rates—a remarkable feat in 
itself—but it was never a study of legal constraint. In a nutshell, 
Professor Huang counted reversals, comparing the rate of reversal 
during busy times and not-so-busy times, both within circuits and 
between circuits. And Professor Huang is right that comparisons 
involving a high number of cases will lower the risk that the effect he 
has identified is merely the byproduct of a higher proportion of 
reversal-prone cases in the unimpacted circuits. Nevertheless, even if 
we assume that each court had the exact same proportion of cases 
that, given ordinary workloads, would end up being reversed (or 
“reversal-prone” cases), the study provides no way to determine 
whether the drop in reversals reflects an increase or decrease in the 
 59.  See, e.g., id. at 102 (“More work needs to be done before the relationship between 
salary and judicial quality is understood.”). 
 60. Huang, supra note 16, at 1145. 
 61.  Id. at 1147. 
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proportion of cases determined by straightforward adjudication or, 
relatedly, whether the law constrained judges. In particular, the 
study cannot tell us whether judges under normal workloads were 
more or less likely than busier judges to follow the straightforward 
dictates of the law—or even whether such straightforward  
dictates were present and applicable—when they chose to reverse  
lower court decisions. 
 This is a question that we ought to endeavor to answer. On the 
one hand, it is entirely plausible that judges during unimpacted 
periods are less likely to engage in straightforward adjudication than 
they would be during impacted periods. It could be that they have the 
free time to work around the law, granting them the resources to 
write convincing justifications for the outcomes that they 
ideologically prefer despite the possibility that such outcomes are at 
odds with the facial content of the applicable legal rule. When they 
are busy, it could be that they must limit their justifications to those 
provided by a plain reading of the law's facial content, and, as a 
result, they are unable to reverse lower court decisions that did not 
produce ideologically preferred outcomes. As a result, they might be 
less likely to commit errors of law and might reach ideologically 
preferred outcomes at a lower rate. On the other hand, it is entirely 
plausible that busy judges are more interested in completing cases 
than they are in interpreting those cases in accordance with the law 
or in bringing about ideologically preferred outcomes. As a result of 
their haste, they might be more likely to commit errors of law and 
miss the cases that they should have reversed or inadvertently reach 
ideologically preferred outcomes at a higher rate. 
 The Landes and Posner study also leaves this mystery unsolved.62
While they speculated that conformist and counter-ideological voting 
could be explained by a relationship between increased legal 
constraint and higher workloads, they did not rule out other 
explanations.63 Indeed, the decision of judges in the ideological 
minority to resist dissent might be a reflection of power dynamics or 
mere laziness rather than a respect for the prevailing law in a circuit. 
As claimed by some adherents of the “strategic” or “institutionalist” 
model,64 counter-ideological voting might arise from, say, a bargain 
with the other appellate panel judge: if I agree to go along with the 
writing judge in the next several cases, she will agree to go along 
with me in the one case that is very important to me down the road. 
Or the judges might be aware that the majority bloc of judges would 
never be persuaded by a dissent, so the effort to signal a case for en 
 62. See Landes & Posner, supra note 18. 
 63.  Id. at 820-21. 
 64.  See James F. Spriggs II & David R. Stras, Explaining Plurality Decisions, 99 GEO.
L.J. 515, 533-36 (2011). 
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banc review would be fruitless. Or the judges might be acting out of 
fear of retaliation from other branches of government. Again, any 
number of explanations might suffice.  
 Lastly, while the Choi and Baker studies are welcome antiseptics 
to the hyperbolic rhetoric that sometimes accompanies discussions of 
judicial salaries, they too have not yet satisfactorily tested for legal 
constraint under different resource conditions.65 Their tests for 
judicial independence are admirable, but they mirror the tests for 
ideological voting used in the Landes study and, therefore, suffer 
from the same shortcomings—namely, that voting in what appears to 
be a counter-ideological manner is not necessarily evidence of legal 
constraint.66 Their model has additional limitations, however. 
Judicial salary is a poorer measure of resources than workload. While 
salary can change the caliber of the people hired for the job, it would 
not likely affect on-the-job performance beyond the margins. There 
are greater disparities in the amount of cases that judges are asked 
to complete per day than there are in judicial salary (or quality).67
And no matter how much a judge is paid, there will always be only 
twenty-four hours in a day. 
 In summary, the handful of existing empirical studies on this 
subject provides evidence of a relationship between how judges vote 
and how many resources they have. They are landmark studies for 
probing this connection. They do not show, however, that a lack of 
resources makes judges more likely to follow the law. The two 
primary shortcomings are that they do not identify the 
straightforward legal result in the cases that they analyze and they 
do not have a test that allows us to verify that the judges have been 
constrained by law in the cases before them. These scholars are not 
alone. In the following section, I detail how the majority of empirical 
studies of judging share these weaknesses in the hope that we can 
elucidate the way in which methodologies might be changed to  
alleviate them.  
 65.  See Baker, supra note 20; Choi et al., supra note 19. 
 66.  See supra notes 60-63, 65 and accompanying text. 
 67.  U.S. immigration judges hear about 1,200 cases annually and were paid a starting 
salary of approximately $120,000 in 2006. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE,
GAO-06-381, PERSONNEL PRACTICES: CONVERSIONS OF EMPLOYEES FROM NONCAREER 
TO CAREER POSITIONS MAY 2001 - APRIL 2005 33-34, 75 (2006), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06381.pdf; Julia Preston, Lawyers Back Creating New 
Immigration Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2010, at A14. Compare this to U.S. Supreme 
Court justices, who hear only about 75 cases annually and were paid a starting salary of 
approximately $210,000 in 2009. BARBARA L. SCHWEMLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
RL33245, LEGISLATIVE, EXECUTIVE, AND JUDICIAL OFFICIALS: PROCESS FOR ADJUSTING PAY
AND CURRENT SALARIES 8 (2011). 
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B.   The Challenges of Modeling Law’s Effect on Judging 
 How do we know when a judge has been constrained by law? This 
is a question that has plagued empiricists for decades. There are two 
main difficulties—one from law and the other from behavior. On the 
law side, it is hard to know objectively what the correct legal outcome 
of a case is. On the behavioral side, it is tough to distinguish between 
judicial decisions that are the result of legal constraint and those 
that are the result of something nonlegal like ideology, strategy, or 
laziness; the decisions, themselves, might look identical. If we cannot 
draw lines between these behaviors, it might prove too challenging to 
isolate law’s effect. The lion’s share of empirical scholarship reflects a 
tendency to avoid these problems rather than to face them head on. I 
argue that if we are willing to broaden our methodological 
approaches, such as by including behavioral experimentation, we can 
eliminate or alleviate the troubles they cause. 
 1.   Identifying the Law 
 In modeling legal constraint, scholars initially focused on judges’ 
ideological preferences,68 and for good reason. Political scientists were 
the first to be interested in the project of empirically analyzing 
whether law influences judges, and they widely believed at the outset 
that the judiciary, like other branches of government, is a political 
organ that has an interest in instituting its own policy.69 In short, 
they hypothesized that the judge’s ideological preference would be 
the best predictor of the outcome of the case before the judge when 
political stakes were high. Most famously, political scientists used 
the party of the individual responsible for a judge’s appointment as a 
simple proxy for the judge’s attitude in politically divisive cases.70
The results were astounding.71 This factor, alone, has been shown to 
 68.  See DAVID W. ROHDE & HAROLD J. SPAETH, SUPREME COURT DECISION MAKING 78 
(1976) (“[Attitude is] a set of interrelated beliefs that a person has toward some object and 
the situation within which it is encountered.”). These scholars are called “attitudinalists.” 
Tracey E. George & Albert H. Yoon, Chief Judges: The Limits of Attitudinal Theory and 
Possible Paradox of Managerial Judging, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1, 4 (2008). 
 69.  See Lee Epstein et al., Judging Statutes: Thoughts on Statutory Interpretation and 
Notes for a Project on the Internal Revenue Code, 13 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 305, 320-21 
(2003); RICHARD POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 47 (2008). 
 70.  See Frank B. Cross, Decisionmaking in the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals, 91 
CALIF. L. REV. 1457, 1479 (2003) (“Most empirical studies of ideology in decisionmaking use 
the political party of the judge's appointing president as a proxy for the judge's own 
political ideology.”). 
 71. See ROBERT A. CARP & C.K. ROWLAND, POLICYMAKING AND POLITICS IN THE 
FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS 51-83 (1983); DANIEL R. PINELLO, GAY RIGHTS AND AMERICAN 
LAW 78 tbl.3.1, 80 tbl.3.2 (2003); Tracey E. George, Court Fixing, 43 ARIZ. L. REV. 9, 33 
(2001); Tracey E. George, Developing a Positive Theory of Decisionmaking on U.S. Courts of 
Appeals, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 1635, 1636, 1651 (1998); Carol T. Kulik et al., Here Comes the 
Judge: The Influence of Judge Personal Characteristics on Federal Sexual Harassment Case 
Outcomes, 27 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 69, 74-76, 81-82 (2003); Stuart S. Nagel, Judicial 
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have considerable predictive force at the Supreme Court level.72 Early 
proponents of this approach supposed that when judges voted in a 
manner that was consistent with their ideologies, they were not 
being constrained by law.73 When judges voted counter-ideologically, 
however, Attitudinalists were willing to concede that the outcome 
might be legally dictated.74 That is to say that when the input of 
ideology matched the judge vote, then the result was a finding of no 
legal constraint, and vice versa. 
 This “counter-ideological voting” model is still prevalent. Indeed, 
the Landes, Choi, and Baker studies all employ a version of it.75
Rather than replacing it, the primary mode of methodological 
innovation was to improve the modeling of judges’ ideological 
preferences. Scholars devised better ways to identify the ideology of 
judges or included new variables that reflected behavioral or 
personal characteristics.76 For example, they added race, gender, age, 
or prior experience to the list of independent variables.77 Other times, 
they used more accurate or scientific proxies for ideology.78 Again, 
results were impressive. It has been shown that female judges on 
federal appellate panels were significantly more likely to find for the 
plaintiff in Title VII sexual harassment and sex discrimination cases 
independent of political ideology,79 were significantly more likely to 
                                                                                                                  
Backgrounds and Criminal Cases, 53 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 333, 334-35 
(1962); Donald R. Songer & Martha Humphries Ginn, Assessing the Impact of Presidential 
and Home State Influences on Judicial Decisionmaking in the United States Courts of 
Appeals, 55 POL. RES. Q. 299 (2002); Cass R. Sunstein et al., Ideological Voting on Federal 
Courts of Appeals: A Preliminary Investigation, 90 VA. L. REV. 301 (2004); Sarah 
Westergren, Note, Gender Effects in the Courts of Appeals Revisited: The Data Since 1994,
92 GEO. L.J. 689, 702-04 (2004). 
 72. See PINELLO, supra note 71; Cross, supra note 70, at 1479-81. 
 73. See Jeffrey A. Segal & Harold J. Spaeth, The Authors Respond, 4 LAW AND 
COURTS, 10, 10-12 (1994). 
 74.  Francisco J. Benzoni & Christopher S. Dodrill, Does Judicial Philosophy Matter?: 
A Case Study, 113 W. VA. L. REV. 287, 287-89 (2011). 
 75.  Landes & Posner, supra note 18, at 823; Choi et al., supra note 19, at 78-92; 
Baker, supra note 20, at 85-94. 
 76.  One approach was to devise ideology scores that were based on exogenous factors. 
See, e.g., Corey Rayburn Yung, Judged by the Company You Keep: An Empirical Study of 
the Ideologies of Judges on the United States Courts of Appeals, 51 B.C. L. REV. 1133, 1178 
(2010) (discussing endogeneity problem with using data culled from judges’ votes to predict 
those same votes). 
 77. See, e.g., Elaine Martin & Barry Pyle, Gender, Race, and Partisanship on the 
Michigan Supreme Court, 63 ALB. L. REV. 1205 (2000) (race); Jennifer L. Peresie, Note,
Female Judges Matter: Gender and Collegial Decisionmaking in the Federal Appellate 
Courts, 114 YALE L.J. 1759, 1768–87 (2005) (gender); Sheldon Goldman, Voting Behavior 
on the United States Courts of Appeals Revisited, 69 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 491, 499, 499 tbl.6, 
500-01, 501 tbl.7 (1975) (age); Paul J. Wahlbeck et al., The Politics of Dissents and 
Concurrences on the U.S. Supreme Court, 27 AM. POL. Q. 488, 494 (1999) (experience). 
 78. See, e.g., Andrew D. Martin & Kevin M. Quinn, Assessing Preference Change on 
the U.S. Supreme Court, 23 J. OF L., ECON. & ORG., 303, 303-325 (2007). 
 79.  Peresie, supra note 77; Nancy E. Crowe, The Effects of Judges' Sex and Race on 
Judicial Decision Making on the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 1981-96 (dissertation, Dept. of 
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rule in favor of gay rights claims,80 and decided divorce cases and 
custody disputes differently in many respects.81 Other studies of 
federal courts found that older judges were more conservative in a 
number of areas, such as labor cases and draft resistance cases.82
 Despite these worthwhile findings, it is evident that the counter-
ideological voting approach does not succeed in verifying whether 
judges were constrained by law. As to identifying the specific impact 
of law on judging—rather than inferring its absence from the 
predicting power of nonlegal inputs—things have progressed slowly. 
Legal scholars of all stripes understand the complexity of finding and 
applying law, so developing a falsifiable model of legal effect, known 
as a “legal model,” is quite difficult.83
 Nevertheless, more and more scholars are willing to enter the 
thicket of legal interpretation when they study judicial voting. In 
their review of empirical analysis of opinions between 1956 and mid-
2006, Mark A. Hall and Ronald F. Wright found that studies 
analyzing the content of opinions beyond the mere the analysis of 
outcomes and general area of law are on the rise.84 Between 1956 and 
1989, a thirty-three-year period, only twenty-five such studies had 
been published.85 In the next ten-year period, however, there were 
fifty-seven.86 And in the first six and a half years of this millennium, 
there were fifty-two.87
 One promising approach that has arisen among the legal modelers 
has been to identify a rather simple legal rule or tenet of the 
established legal canons of construction and analyze whether its 
implementation brings about a predictable change in judges’ votes. 
While these studies do not typically seek to isolate legal effect from 
all institutional or other effects,88 they are nevertheless insightful. 
                                                                                                                  
Political Science, University of Chicago 1999) discussed in Theresa M. Beiner, Diversity on 
the Bench and the Quest for Justice for All, 33 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 481, 485 (2007). 
 80.  PINELLO, supra note 71, at 83. 
 81.  See Martin & Pyle, supra note 77; Vicki C. Jackson, What Judges Can Learn from 
Gender Bias Task Force Studies, 81 JUDICATURE 15, 21 n.38 (1997). 
 82.  See Goldman, supra note 77; Herbert M. Kritzer, Political Correlates of the 
Behavior of Federal District Judges: A “Best Case” Analysis, 40 J. POL. 25, 28, 50 (1978). 
 83.  See David S. Law & David Zaring, Law Versus Ideology: The Supreme Court and 
the Use of Legislative History, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1653, 1691 (2010) (“Until recently, it 
would have been difficult to identify an objective and convenient way to rate the complexity 
of large quantities of text.”). 
 84.  See generally Mark A. Hall & Ronald F. Wright, Systematic Content Analysis of 
Judicial Opinions, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 63, 72, 121 (2008). 
 85.  Id. at 72. 
 86. Id. 
 87.  Id.
 88. See Jason J. Czarnezki & William K. Ford, The Phantom Philosophy? An 
Empirical Investigation of Legal Interpretation, 65 MD. L. REV. 841, 857 (2006) (“[I]t eludes 
us how to test whether agreement in a unanimous cases is based on legal or policy 
preferences, absent candid participant statements or more sophisticated information about 
the judges’ preferences.”). 
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Some legal modelers have chosen to test vertical stare decisis in the 
federal appellate courts by analyzing whether trends in lower court 
outcomes predictably changed in accordance with new rules issued by 
the Supreme Court—expected statistically significant changes were 
observed.89 Others have analyzed standards of review, determining 
the relative likelihood of affirmance under increasingly deferential 
standards (de novo, clearly erroneous and abuse of discretion, 
substantial evidence, arbitrary and capricious).90 As expected under 
the legal point of view, the level of affirmance corresponded to the 
level of deference.91 On the other hand, studies have shown that the 
predictions of legalism can come up short. One example tested 
adherence to horizontal stare decisis at the Supreme Court by 
determining whether dissenters in a case had changed their positions 
when the progeny of that case later came before them.92 Justices 
overwhelmingly continued to dissent in progeny cases.93
 While this approach has the advantage that it does not require the 
empiricist to engage in complex and potentially subjective 
interpretation of law, its primary disadvantage is that simple, 
straightforward examples of legal application are rare. And even 
when they are found, they rarely stay straightforward for long. Law 
is a moving target; it constantly evolves through application, 
especially in a system of precedent like we have in the United 
States.94 As a result, opportunities for complex study—such as the 
study of limited resources on constraint—are far too rare.  
 Returning to the question of how to analyze resource restriction on 
judges, we must develop a methodology that allows for the analysis of 
cases with known legally straightforward outcomes in a variety of 
subject areas and conditions. Because law’s intrinsic constraining 
power is a fundamental concern for those seeking to determine the 
appropriate amount of resources, the question of whether judges are 
likely to engage in straightforward adjudication under legal rules 
cannot be ignored. So how do we overcome the fact that suitable 
conditions for analyzing the manner of adjudication in actual cases is 
 89.  See, e.g., Donald R. Songer & Reginald S. Sheehan, Supreme Court Impact on 
Compliance and Outcomes: Miranda and New York Times in the United States Courts of 
Appeals, 43 W. POL. Q. 297, 308-12 (1990). 
 90.  Cross, supra note 70, at 1500-03; see also Paul R. Verkuil, An Outcomes Analysis 
of Scope of Review Standards, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 679, 682 (2002); Francis M. Allegra, 
Section 482: Mapping the Contours of the Abuse of Discretion Standard of Judicial Review,
13 VA. TAX REV. 423, 461-73 (1994).  
 91.  Cross, supra note 70, at 1499-1503, 1511.  
 92.  See HAROLD J. SPAETH & JEFFREY A. SEGAL, MAJORITY RULE OR MINORITY WILL:
ADHERENCE TO PRECEDENT ON THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 287-315 (1999).  
 93.  See id.
 94.  See Frederick Schauer, The Tyranny of Choice and the Rulification of Standards,
14 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 803, 807-08 (2005) (discussing how repeated application of 
laws makes rules more like standards and standards more like rules over time). 
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so rare? One way is to move beyond the limits of the data we can 
gather from the courts themselves and embrace other methodologies 
such as behavioral experimentation. Experimentation makes it easy 
to draft perfectly tailored, straightforward laws that can be used in a 
variety of contexts. Moreover, it allows the empiricist to control legal 
evolution; he or she can manipulate the number of sources of legal 
authority, whether stare decisis applies, or whether there have been 
prior applications of a statute, just to name a few. In Part III, I detail 
my experimental design, which attempts specifically to implement 
these methodological innovations. 
 2.   Identifying Constrained Behavior 
 The study of law’s impact on judicial decisionmaking requires 
empiricists to be very choosy about the behavior upon which they 
focus. The behavior must be easy to identify without recourse to 
subjectivity, and it is most desirable if it can be coded numerically. 
The earliest empirical studies to make waves in the legal academy 
focused on the judge’s vote, making it the dependent variable in their 
analyses.95 This is not surprising. For one, outcomes are a salient 
aspect of judicial decisionmaking, perhaps the most important 
aspect. Indeed, it cannot be disputed that parties care quite a bit 
about whether they prevail or not; it is even difficult to imagine that 
they would care as much or more about the particular manner in 
which the judge reached that result.96 Likewise, legal practitioners 
focus on outcomes because precedential force is intimately tied to 
them; all aspects of an opinion that are unnecessary to justify the 
outcome are considered dicta and are nonbinding.97 Lastly, the 
outcome-centric method is apt for empirical examination. Identifying 
outcomes is straightforward—winners and losers are usually obvious 
and binary—and in most cases the assignment of political or 
 95. See James F. Spriggs II & Thomas G. Hanford, Measuring Legal Change: The 
Reliability and Validity of Shepard's Citations, 53 POL. RES. Q. 327, 327-28 (2000) (“Since 
the 1940s, with the publication of C. Herman Pritchett's The Roosevelt Court (1948), 
scholars interested in courts have relied on judges’ final votes on the merits (i.e., whether 
supporting the liberal or conservative position) as the primary indicator of judicial 
outcomes. By examining individual judges' votes or collective court outcomes, this approach 
has generated a considerable body of knowledge regarding the causal forces underlying 
case dispositions.”) (citations omitted); see also GLENDON SCHUBERT, THE JUDICIAL MIND 17
(1976); STUART S. NAGEL, THE LEGAL PROCESS FROM A BEHAVIORAL PERSPECTIVE (1969); 
JOHN D. SPRAGUE, VOTING PATTERNS OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT (1968). 
 96.  This is not to suggest, of course, that they care only about winning. See Jeffrey 
Swanson et al., Justice Disparities: Does the ADA Enforcement System Treat People with 
Psychiatric Disabilities Fairly?, 66 MD. L. REV. 94, 103 (2006) (“People care about winning 
and losing, but they are also influenced in the assessment of their experience by certain 
key factors: giving ‘voice’ to their story, having an honest and unbiased decisionmaker, 
being treated with dignity, and having a fair process of decision.”) (footnotes omitted).  
 97.  See FRANK B. CROSS, DECISION MAKING IN THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS
205 (2007). 
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ideological valences to those outcomes is uncontroversial.98 Thus, it 
came to be that those engaged in quantitative study of judicial 
decisionmaking adopted a sort of behaviorist approach: they assumed 
that the judicial mind, and even the legal opinion springing 
therefrom, ought to be treated as a black box; they focused instead 
upon the various inputs bearing on the deciding judge and the single 
output of the determination of the case.99
 Indeed, out of hundreds of articles, I was able to locate only a 
couple dozen published studies that use a different dependent 
variable in the study of judicial decisionmaking.100 Not only is it the 
methodological default,101 it is the approach used by several of the 
authors in the preceding section that have studied judicial resources. 
 98.  See JEFFERY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE 
ATTITUDINAL MODEL 243 (1993).  
 99.  See Jack Knight, Are Empiricists Asking the Right Questions about Judicial 
Decisionmaking?, 58 DUKE L.J. 1531, 1534 (2009). 
 100. See generally James R. Acker, A Different Agenda: The Supreme Court, Empirical 
Research Evidence, and Capital Punishment Decisions, 27 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 65, 66-67 
(1993); Lisa Baldez et al., Does the U.S. Constitution Need an Equal Rights Amendment?,
35 J. LEGAL STUD. 243 (2006); Lloyd Dixon & Brian Gill, Changes in the Standards for 
Admitting Expert Evidence in Federal Civil Cases Since the Daubert Decision, 8 PSYCHOL.
PUB. POL’Y L. 251 (2002); Patricia J. Falk, The Prevalence of Social Science in Gay Rights 
Cases, 41 WAYNE L. REV. 1; Henry F. Fradella, A Content Analysis of Federal Judicial 
Views of the Social Science ‘Researcher’s Black Arts,’ 35 RUTGERS L.J. 103 (2003); Peter J. 
Hammer & William M. Sage, Antitrust, Health Care Quality, and the Courts, 102 COLUM.
L. REV. 546-649 (2002); Michael A. Perino, Law, Ideology, and Strategy in Judicial Decision 
Making: Evidence from Securities Fraud Actions, 3 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 497 (2006); 
Glenn A. Phelps & John B. Gates, The Myth of Jurisprudence: Interpretive Theory in the 
Constitutional Opinions of Justices Rehnquist and Brennan, 31 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 567 
(1991); Mark J. Richards & Herbert M. Kritzer, Jurisprudential Regimes in Supreme Court 
Decision Making, 96 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 305 (2002); Daniel M. Schneider, Empirical 
Research on Judicial Reasoning: Statutory Interpretation in Federal Tax Cases, 31 N.M. L.
REV. 325 (2001); Glendon Schubert, Jackson's Judicial Philosophy: An Exploration in 
Value Analysis, 59 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 940; Peter H. Schuck & Theodore Hsien Wang, 
Continuity and Change: Patterns of Litigation in the Courts, 1979-90, 45 STAN. L. REV. 115 
(1992); Gregory C. Sisk et al., Charting the Influences on the Judicial Mind: An Empirical 
Study of Judicial Reasoning, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1377 (1998); Joseph L. Smith & Emerson 
H. Tiller, The Strategy of Judging: Evidence from Administrative Law, 31 J. LEGAL STUD.
61 (2002); John A. Swain & Edwin E. Aguilar, Piercing the Veil to Assert Personal 
Jurisdiction Over Corporate Affiliates: An Empirical Study of the Cannon Doctrine, 84 B.U.
L. REV. 445 (2004); Robert B. Thompson, Piercing the Corporate Veil: An Empirical Study,
76 CORNELL L. REV. 1036 (1991); R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Is the Federal 
Circuit Succeeding? An Empirical Assessment of Judicial Performance, 152 U. PA. L. REV.
1105 (2004).   
 101. See Barry Friedman & Andrew J. Martin, Looking for Law in All the  
Wrong Places: Some Suggestions for Modeling Legal Decisionmaking 35 (Ind.  
Univ. Maurer Sch. of Law, Working Paper, Mar. 13, 2009), available at
http://adm.wustl.edu/media/working/f_and_m.pdf (“Finally, we mention the distinction 
between the outcome of a case, and the opinion drafted by the court in that case. This is a 
distinction that has drawn attention in the literature. Yet, many studies—hampered no 
doubt by coding problems—continue to focus only on outcomes, as though that is all there 
is to law.”) (citations omitted); Hon. Harry T. Edwards & Michael A. Livermore, Pitfalls of 
Empirical Studies that Attempt to Understand the Factors Affecting Appellate 
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 The upside of the judicial vote is its straightforwardness and 
simplicity, but that can also be its downside. A judicial vote says very 
little about the deliberation and decisionmaking that led to it. 
Indeed, the institutional model, one of the most important 
advancements in the empirical study of judging, arose from the 
observation that just because a judge voted counter-ideologically  
does not necessarily mean that the judge’s decision arose out of  
the perception that she was constrained by law against  
voting ideologically.102
 Institutionalists point out that the same result might be explained 
by nonlegal and institutionally related desires such as career 
advancement, avoidance of fatigue, diplomacy with copanelists, 
minimizing the risk that her decision will be overturned, etc. One 
study in this vein discovered that federal judges are more likely to 
cite decisions authored by judges that have cited them.103 Another 
found that judges were less likely to disagree with one another the 
longer they served together.104 Several have found “panel effects:” 
appellate judges sitting on panels vote differently depending upon 
the preferences of the other judges with whom they sit. While an 
internecine debate has arisen among empiricists over whether panel 
effects arise from strategic motivations or from the persuasive 
influence of panel members during deliberation about the correct 
legal case outcome,, the disputants on both sides tend to rely on the 
sole dependent variable of judicial vote.105
 How do we improve the model? There are at least two obvious 
ways: introduce dependent variables in addition to judicial vote into 
the analysis and study judges in simpler contexts.  
 With respect to the former, the more reliable information that we 
can gather about our judges, the easier it becomes to identify their 
precise motivations or, at least, to rule out nonlegal motivations. 
While identification sounds like a daunting task, there is reason to be 
                                                                                                                  
Decisionmaking, 58 DUKE L.J. 1895, 1924 (2009); Jason J. Czarnezki, Voting and Electoral 
Politics in the Wisconsin Supreme Court, 87 MARQ. L. REV. 323, 337 (2003). 
 102. See, e.g., Frank B. Cross and Blake J. Nelson, Strategic Institutional Effects on 
Supreme Court Decisionmaking, 95 NW. U.L. REV. 1437 (2001). 
 103. See Steven J. Choi & Mitu Gulati, Bias in Judicial Citations: A Window into the 
Behavior of Judges?, 37 J. LEGAL STUD. 87, 92-93 (2008) (analyzing judge strategy in 
citation); cf. LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE (1998) (analyzing 
rational choice theory and judicial decisionmaking). 
 104.  See Czarnezki & Ford, supra note 88, at 883-84 (this theory did not strictly use 
dispositional votes or outcomes as a dependent variable, but also looked at agreement 
between dyads of votes). 
 105.  Pauline T. Kim, Deliberation and Strategy on the United States Courts of Appeals: 
An Empirical Exploration of Panel Effects, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1319, 1321-24 (2009); 
Stefanie A. Lindquist & Wendy L. Martinek, Response, Psychology, Strategy, and 
Behavioral Equivalence, 158 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 75 (2009); Derek J. Linkous & 
Emerson H. Tiller, Response, Panel Effects, Whistleblowing Theory, and the Role of Legal 
Doctrine, 158 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 83 (2009). 
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optimistic. Efforts to look beyond vote have been promising.106 And it 
is becoming more feasible to analyze the content of text with the 
assistance of computers, which preserve uniformity and objectivity.107
 But just as we should not be tethered to judicial vote alone, we 
should not be wedded to publicly available court documents. We may 
choose to study judging in the laboratory—as I did here—which 
allows us to gather vastly more information about the 
decisionmaking process from subjects while maintaining our focus on 
objective quantitative data. In the following section, I will detail my 
choice to include an additional dependent variable, sense of 
righteousness, into the model. 
 With respect to the latter, we must consider finding simpler 
contexts to study. Complex institutions provide a multitude of potential 
judicial motivations, some legal and some nonlegal. For example, by 
analyzing judges that are not in panels, we can rule out the possibility 
that counter-ideological voting is a strategic decision designed to 
maximize the likelihood that an ideological outcomes will come about in 
other cases. In this vein, the laboratory is also a wonderful resource 
because laws, cases, judges, or institutions can be streamlined to better 
isolate judicial motivations. The existence and composition of panel 
members can be controlled with ease. The structure of review can be 
customized to fit the needs of the research project.  
III.   EXPERIMENT DESIGN
 First, I would like briefly to defend behavioral methodologies for 
the study of judging, generally. Thereafter, I will discuss the contours 
of the specific methodology used here. 
 106.  Even early efforts sometimes utilized content-based dependent variables. See, e.g.,
Donald R. Songer & Reginald S. Sheehan, Supreme Court Impact on Compliance and 
Outcomes: Miranda and New York Times in the United States Courts of Appeals, 43 W.
POL. Q. 297, 303-04 (1990) (using Shepard’s to find citation to Miranda or New York Times
to determine whether the lower court’s observation of precedent was in full compliance, 
compliant and correctly anticipating future Supreme Court modifications of the landmark 
decision, narrow compliance, or noncompliant and then setting that as dependent 
variable); Andrew P. Morriss, Signaling and Precedent in Federal District Court Opinions,
13 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 63 (2005); Orin S. Kerr, Shedding Light on Chevron: An Empirical 
Study of the Chevron Doctrine in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 15 YALE J. ON REG. 1 (1998); 
James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Canons of Construction and the Elusive Quest for 
Neutral Reasoning, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1 (2005).  
 107.  See Daniel E. Ho & Kevin M. Quinn, Viewpoint Diversity and Media 
Consolidation: An Empirical Study, 61 STAN. L. REV. 781, 805 (2009) (“One promising 
approach to avoid the subjectivity of manual content analysis is automated computational 
language processing. Over the past few years, rapid advances in computer science and 
linguistics have enabled scholars to process text information in automated ways, thereby 
facilitating statistical analysis of large amounts of news.”); Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu 
Gulati, Which Judges Write Their Opinions (and Should We Care?), 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
1077 (2005); Brady Coleman, Lord Denning and Justice Cardozo: The Judge as Poet-
Philosopher, 32 RUTGERS L.J. 485 (2001). 
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 While I endorse behavioral experimentation as a worthwhile 
methodology for the study of judging, I admit that there might be 
several ways to capture legal constraint through the popular 
technique of statistically analyzing actual cases.108 If so, then that 
approach would have much to recommend it. The results could be 
statistically robust because of the large number of cases, there is a 
good chance that it would have strong predictive power because the 
data are from real legal actors in real legal cases, the project would 
not be particularly costly, and it would not prove particularly difficult 
to duplicate. There are several factors that stand in the way, 
however. Real-world circumstances might demand an extraordinarily 
high number of subjects in order to preserve generalizability. It is 
therefore possible that comparisons would be made between cases 
from very different time periods, from very different judges, with 
very different facts, under very different areas of law, and from very 
different regions.109 Using multiple regression could control the 
influence of some of these factors,110 but doing so might come at the 
cost of power in the analysis.111 While the problem is not 
insurmountable,112 it remains a substantial issue. Lastly, it would be 
difficult to get a reliable sense of the strength of the judge’s 
ideological conviction. This would be especially tricky for 
measurements before and after application of a rule or standard. 
Certainly, great progress has been made in deciphering judicial 
ideology,113 but the measures will always have an air of speculation 
because published cases might not be accurate indications of judicial 
ideology or preference.  
 108.  For example, a model in which statutory rules and standards serve as 
independent variables and time of decision is a dependent variable could potentially 
capture them. Appellate court opinions could be coded to reflect whether the norms 
considered therein are rules or standards, and they would be analyzed to determine the 
time that it took to render a decision, such as the number of days between the date argued 
and the date of decision.  
It would be ideal if the database of cases was such that it allowed for a comparison of 
the time of decision between a case in which a judge decided under a standard and a case 
in which the same judge decided a nearly identical issue but under a rule. It is likely that 
such comparisons would be very rare, indeed, and thus would likely be separated by many 
months or years. In that circumstance, it would be quite important to account for 
exogenous factors that might affect time, such as spikes in docket load. 
 109.  See Michael Heise, The Past, Present, and Future of Empirical Legal Scholarship: 
Judicial Decision Making and the New Empiricism, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 819 (2002) 
(discussing frequency of such problems in empirical scholarship). 
 110.  See Hall & Wright, supra note 84, at 119. 
 111.  See H.M. Blalock, Jr., Correlated Independent Variables: The Problem of 
Multicollinearity, 42 SOC. FORCES 233 (1963) (“Whenever two supposedly independent 
variables are highly correlated, it will be difficult to assess their relative importance in 
determining some dependent variable. The higher the correlation between independent 
variables the greater the sampling error of the partials.”). 
 112.  Cf. Bert I. Huang, Lightened Scrutiny, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1109 (2011). 
 113.  The development of the Segal-Cover and Martin-Quinn scores have  
improved prediction. 
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 Using behavioral simulations to gather data rather than using 
case databases can alleviate many of these problems.114 The 
laboratory allows for systematic control and randomization, neither 
of which is feasible with real-world data.115 Moreover, it best meets 
the challenge of using pure examples of rules and standards, finding 
cases with identical facts, and controlling for exogenous factors that 
might impact time. To be sure, the price comes in external validity; 
generally speaking,116 the more unrealistic an experiment is, the less 
generalizable its results.117 As mentioned, I used law students rather 
than actual judges, who are often unavailable.118 Psychologists have 
tested laboratory external validity and found that the results exhibit 
surprisingly strong generality in some contexts.119 There is no 
guarantee that judging is one of those contexts, of course.120
 Having made the case for behavioral experimentation generally,  
I will now turn to the merits of the particular research design  
used here. 
A.   The Elements of Legal Constraint 
 A basic component of our faith in law’s efficacy is our assumption 
that law constrains those subject to it.121 Law is written so that those 
who interpret it will conclude that some conduct is legally ruled 
out.122 Even if the interpreter would want to engage in a particular 
conduct or would prefer to make that conduct legal, the law has the 
capacity to make doing so much more difficult. That is, it has the 
 114.  Norbert L. Kerr & Robert M. Bray, Simulation, Realism, and the Study of the 
Jury, in PSYCHOLOGY AND LAW 326 (Neil Brewer & Kipling D. Williams eds., 2005) 
(“Unfortunately, a strength of one strategy is often a limitation of another. Regardless of 
which method is used, researchers always face dilemmas in that they cannot (in a given 
study) simultaneously maximize (1) realism (i.e., the concreteness of the behavioral 
system), (2) precision of control and measurement, and (3) generality over actors, 
behaviors, and situations.”). 
 115.  See Tor, supra note 31. 
 116.  Kerr & Bray, supra note 114, at 341 (noting that this is not a necessary relation). 
 117.  See Tor, supra note 31.  
 118.  See discussion supra Part I. 
 119.  See, e.g., Craig A. Anderson, James J. Lindsay & Brad J. Bushman, Research in 
the Psychological Laboratory: Truth or Triviality?, 8 CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOL.
SCI. 3, 8 (1999) (“The obvious conclusion . . . is that the psychological laboratory is doing 
quite well in terms of external validity; it has been discovering truth, not triviality.”). 
 120.  Cf., e.g., K. Anders Ericsson , M.J. Prietula, M. J., & E. T. Cokely, The Making of 
an Expert, 85 HARV. BUS. REV. 114-21 (2007) (showing influence of development in one’s 
training on skills and expertise). 
 121.  See, e.g., P.S. Atiyah, Form and Substance in Legal Reasoning: The Case of 
Contract, in THE LEGAL MIND: ESSAYS FOR TONY HONORE 25, 27 (Neil MacCormick & Peter 
Birks eds., 1986) (“The concept of a system of precedent is that it constrains judges in some 
cases to follow decisions they do not agree with.”); HANS KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW 4-
13 (Max Knight trans., 1967).  
 122.  See Scott J. Shapiro, The Difference That Rules Make, in ANALYZING LAW: NEW 
ESSAYS IN LEGAL THEORY 33-62 (Brian Bix ed., 1998). 
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power to constrain them from bringing about the result that she 
would otherwise prefer. Constraint can be complete; the judge might 
decide the case in the direction that is at odds with what they would 
prefer. Or constraint can be partial; the judge ultimately decides the 
case in the direction she desires, but she had to work harder to 
justify the decision because the law appears initially to favor ruling 
in the other direction.  
 1.   Conflict as a Prerequisite for Constraint 
 As discussed,123 the felt difficulty of a case comes from a 
combination of perceived restrictions posed by the judge’s personal 
and/or ideological preferences and the content of legal norms. As to 
the former, the typical judge faces each new case with potentially 
conflicting bases for decision. On the one hand, she seeks to follow 
her oath of fidelity to the legal materials; and on the other hand she 
seeks to do what is right, all things considered. The first demands 
that the outcome be dictated by law, and the second demands, at 
least in part, that the outcome be dictated by ideology or personal 
morality.124 These bases for decision come into conflict when the 
judge believes that the law directs her to decide the case in a  
way that is at odds with her ideological, moral, or personally  
preferred outcome.  
 Certain cases are more likely to instill a feeling of conflict in the 
interpreting judge. For example, some factual scenarios are much 
more likely to bring about considerable desires for particular case 
outcomes than others. Likewise, some laws are much more likely to 
call clearly for particular outcomes, which may be at odds with what 
the judge desires. The first tendency is obvious. High profile cases or 
cases involving hot button political issues tend to rouse the 
passions.125 The second tendency is slightly more complex. Conflict is 
most likely to occur when there is no real dispute about rule choice 
(only one rule is clearly germane) or facts and the rule is such that 
the ordinary interpreter could plausibly believe it has one 
determinate meaning with respect to the facts of the case.126 Focusing 
on the law portion of this combination, clear rules, as opposed to 
vague standards, maximize the likelihood of conflict between fidelity 
to law and ideological passion. In order to clarify the rule/standard 
 123.  See supra Part I.B. 
 124.  See Duncan Kennedy, Strategizing Strategic Behavior in Legal Interpretation,
1996 UTAH L. REV. 785, 816 (1996) (“To say they experience role conflict is to say that it 
would be problematic for them to exclude ideology because there is something in their 
understanding of the judge's role that seems to push to include it.”). 
 125.  DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION (FIN DE SIÈCLE) 160 (1994).  
 126.  See id.
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dichotomy, it will be helpful to consider the basic types of laws that 
judges ordinarily encounter. 
 A Basic Account of Rules and Standards: When we picture a rule, 
we tend to think of a speed limit or voting age requirement.127 When 
we picture a standard, we tend to think of the reasonableness 
requirement.128 If we put aside, for the moment, the judge’s feelings 
about what the best outcomes in these cases would be in the absence 
of law, we can imagine that a judge who considers only, say, speeding 
cases that are governed by speed limit rules would have a fairly easy 
job. We might even conclude that her job would be so mechanical that 
it would be boring. On the other hand, if we visualize the same 
passionless judge but this time her speeding cases are governed by a 
reasonableness standard, then we would probably guess that her job 
would be a great deal tougher, routinely forcing her to consider all of 
the thorny circumstances before her. In this simplified context, the 
guidance provided by the rule is welcome—it spares the judge  
from having to do much thinking in reaching the straightforward  
legal result.  
 A More Advanced Account of Rules and Standards: Our sense that 
rules and standards make for easy or hard cases, respectively, fails to 
account for the fact that a rule can make a case very hard for the 
judge who has a strong objection to the result that would come from a 
straightforward application of that rule. Conversely, a standard can 
make it far easier for a judge to reach a desirable result than would a 
conflicting rule. Thus, the mere addition of the judge’s preference to 
our account of rules and standards flips our sense of difficulty 
completely around. This is because the judge’s goal is different; the 
difficulty for the judge comes from her desire to write a convincing 
justification in support of her preferred outcome. That will take 
“work,” which will become a key component of the model of 
constraint. This kind of motivation is controversial yet commonplace; 
politically charged cases are numerous in the appellate courts, and 
such cases can motivate judges to attempt to reach outcomes that are 
consistent with their own political ideologies, even if those outcomes 
seem at first to conflict with the law.129
 127.  See, e.g., Jack F. Williams, The Fallacies of Contemporary Fraudulent Transfer 
Models as Applied to Intercorporate Guaranties: Fraudulent Transfer Law as a Fuzzy 
System, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 1403, 1456 (1994) (“To demonstrate the point: an example 
often given as a rule is ‘speed limit 55.’ ”). 
 128.  See, e.g., Thomas S. Ulen, The Prudence of Law and Economics: Why More 
Economics is Better, 26 CUMB. L. REV. 773, 805 (1996) (“The reach of common law rules is 
attenuated, covering only the facts before the court, deciding issues on a case-by-case basis, 
relying on standards (such as ‘reasonableness’) rather than on bright-line rules.”).  
 129.  See, e.g., STEFANIE A. LINDQUIST & FRANK B. CROSS, MEASURING JUDICIAL 
ACTIVISM 149 (2009). 
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 To be sure, there are numerous instances of “unselfconscious rule-
following,” in which the potency of the law to regulate a dispute and 
the judge’s attitude under the circumstances align to make the case 
seem easy.130 Thereafter, the judge engages in a straightforward 
deductive exercise. She is not even thinking about lawmaking. In this 
case, law operates as a guide rather than as a constraint. While it is 
possible that there is no struggle simply because it appears to the 
judge that the case is easy due to the character of the law to be 
applied, it is also possible that there isn’t a struggle because the 
judges or parties to the case are very lazy, unmotivated, 
unintelligent, or uninformed.131
 In other cases, however, the judge is much more likely to feel 
compelled to engage in some amount of work to reach the result she 
prefers. Successful work permits the judge to convince herself that 
she has written a persuasive, legally based opinion that manages to 
reach the ideological result that she pleases.  
 2.   “Work”: How Resources Interact with Constraint
 The relationship between the law, the likelihood that the judge 
will feel compelled to engage in “work,” and the amount of work that 
the judge believes is necessary can be quite complex.132 But it is 
almost always limited by the basic principle that specificity and 
clarity make conflict possible whereas vagueness does not. Imagine 
that there is only one law to consider in a case and that law is either 
a pure rule or a pure standard. It is far more likely that the judge 
will have to engage in complex interpretive techniques (work) under 
the rule than under the standard because only the rule can restrict 
the judge from reaching her desired outcome. It is difficult to see how 
the judge would have trouble justifying her desired result under a 
standard; as standards will likely make it seem as though the 
legislator of the norm was content to delegate the choice of how to 
regulate the conduct at issue to the judge, effectively allowing her to 
utilize her discretion, including her ideological beliefs.133 In short, 
there is neither an interpretive impediment nor a role conflict that 
could slow the judge from reaching her desired outcome. 
 While this is far from an exhaustive account of work techniques, it 
is enough to illustrate that there is a patterned relationship between 
 130.  KENNEDY, supra note 125, at 160.
 131.  See id. at 170-71. 
 132.  See id. at 169-70. 
 133.  See, e.g., Michael P. Van Alstine, The Judicial Power and Treaty Delegation, 90 
CALIF. L. REV. 1263, 1285 (2002) (“Indeed, sound arguments support a presumption  
of implied delegated authority whenever Congress legislates in the form of  
broad standards.”). 
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the state of the law and the type and amount of work that the judge 
perceives is necessary to justify a desired result.  
 Now that we have a basic understanding of the relationship 
between legal constraint and work, we can consider how it might be 
that restricting legal resources can enhance legal constraint.  
 Work takes time and energy. Duncan Kennedy offers an apt  
phenomenological account:  
[T]he judge has to allocate his time among the cases that 
presently offer him chances to dispose [of] ideological stakes. 
He has to calculate the probable payoff in terms of 
convincing argument and the payoff in terms of ideological 
significance. It is a hard choice when an apparently hard 
case (an easy case for ideological work) offers a low payoff in 
terms of ideological stakes, whereas an apparently easy case 
that is obviously unjust offers a large payoff but might 
require a lot of work, with no guarantee of success (in order 
to overcome the initial sense of being constrained to ‘do the  
wrong thing’).134
The supply of the resources necessary to engage in work, as this era 
of austerity shows, can be in great or short supply. While the 
specificity of law and the direction of ideological preference are the 
factors in the likelihood that conflict will occur, the amount of 
resources is a factor in the likelihood that this conflict will result in 
constraint. Getting around a clear rule that conflicts with a desired 
case outcome takes a lot of work. Sometimes, the work will pay off, 
and the judge will reach the outcome she desires even if it first 
appeared to be legally ruled out. Even when work is successful, the 
rule can have an impact by making the judge’s work harder; it can 
partially constrain her. If the work is hard for a judge under a 
conflicting rule, then it is harder still when she is also short on time 
or other necessary resources. The harder it is for a judge to work 
around a rule, the more likely it is that the judge will follow the rule. 
This is a probable explanation for the tentative finding in earlier 
empirical studies that judges act more deferentially and 
independently when they have fewer resources.135 Thus, theoretically, 
resource reduction can be a means to make rules more effective. On 
the other hand, vague laws, such as those with standards, pose no 
challenge to the judge seeking to bring about her desired result. As a 
consequence, the amount of resources will likely have no effect under 
standards, being as they are weak constraints for motivated judges. 
 134.  KENNEDY, supra note 125, at 166-67.  
 135.  See discussion supra Part I.A. 
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 To summarize, legal rules have the capacity to bring about conflict 
between what the judge perceives is the straightforward legal 
outcome and what she believes ought to be the outcome. In such 
cases, the constrained judge either gives into the law (“complete 
constraint”)136 or she engages in work to write what she believes is a 
convincing legal justification for the outcome she prefers (“partial 
constraint”). The likelihood that work will produce such a 
justification depends, in part, on the amount of resources available to 
the judge. Fewer resources means a lower likelihood of success. 
 3.  Legitimation and Delegitimation 
 When we consider constraint, then, the preference of the legal 
interpreter is the counter-component. Since preference is so 
important, it is worth studying the conditions under which law 
changes judicial preference in its favor. If the law changes people’s 
minds over time so that they no longer want to resist it (or do not 
want to resist it as much), then it can fairly be said to have an 
additional sort of constraining power—it legitimates the conduct that 
it permits or mandates.  
 Many scholars claim that that law has a legitimation effect.137 On 
this account, people may change their moral or ideological beliefs to 
match those that are apparent in the law to which they are subject. 
In cases of conflict, this can fairly be characterized as another form of 
legal constraint because it is the result of a distinctly legal operation 
that changes judicial decisionmaking in a direction intended by law. 
 As with conflict, for a law to have a legitimation effect, that law 
would have to be sufficiently specific: it must suitably demarcate 
legally desirable conduct that is different from what the judges 
already desire. Thus, we can hypothesize that rules, as opposed to 
standards, will produce this effect; standards are vague and fail to 
substitute our values with law’s values.138
 There is also a parallel with the role resources play in conflict, but 
the benefits are inverted. We can hypothesize that when the 
government manipulates the amount of resources it will provide to 
judges, this change will have an impact on judges’ preferences. Most 
likely, judges would feel slighted by the government, perhaps even 
victimized. As a result, they might lose their motivation to be faithful 
to the law and be less inclined to view the law that applies to the 
cases before them as legitimate. Delegitimation might increase 
 136. She might also engage in work only ultimately to give in to the directive of law. 
This is complete constraint as well. 
 137.  See, e.g., Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections 
on Two Decades of Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punishment, 109 HARV. L. REV.
355, 431-36 (1995). 
 138.  See discussion infra Part III.C.1. 
2012]  JUDGING UNDER PRESSURE 961
motivations to reach conclusions that the judges find desirable in 
spite of legal directives. If so, it might overwhelm the initial increase 
in constraint caused by stripping resources.  
 On the other hand, we can speculate that legitimation is most 
likely to occur when the government provides the most pleasing 
conditions for judges. If judges are given plenty of time to do work 
and this nevertheless comes up short—the judges are unable to 
convince themselves that their initially preferred outcomes are 
legally justifiable—it would seem likely that they could become 
convinced that the legal directive and its straightforward result have 
more merit than they initially thought. 
B.   Specific Experimental Design 
 Having set forth the model, I now turn to my experimental 
methodology for testing it. 
 Simply put, my experiment asked law students139 at three top New 
England law schools to serve as mock judges in a simulated case. The 
fact pattern of the case was ideologically salient and divisive—illegal 
immigration—so that there would be a spread of ideological  
strengths and directions.140 Despite its simulative nature, it had real-
world effects because of a handful of monetary interventions that I  
describe below. 
 The model requires that we be able to control and measure several 
dimensions of judging. With respect to the subjects, themselves, we 
must be able to identify the direction and strength of their 
preferences for case outcomes in the absence of law. With respect to 
the laws that the subjects must interpret, we must be able to control 
their direction and specificity. Lastly, with respect to resources, we 
must be able to control the amount available to each subject. I have 
chosen to have a multiphase design: one phase that provides baseline 
measures of the subjects’ preferences in the absence of law, and one 
phase that provides the same measures in the presence of law. In the 
latter phase (hereinafter “law phase”), I vary the amount of resources 
available to the subjects so that I can isolate the effect of resource 
limitation on law’s constraining power. 
 139.  All students had completed a minimum of approximately one academic year  
of study. 
 140.  See Caroll Doherty, Attitudes Toward Immigration in Red and Blue,
PEW RES. CENTER PUBLICATIONS (May 9, 2006), available at
http://pewresearch.org/pubs/24/attitudes-toward-immigration-in-red-and-blue (showing 
roughly even distribution nationally of these that believe immigration is a very big 
problem, a moderately big problem, a small problem, and not a problem at all). 
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 1.   The Two-Phase Design 
The experiment had two phases, both of which were completed 
online. The phases are distinguished by whether they have 
potentially dispositive law or not; the law phase does, and the 
other phase (hereinafter, “baseline phase”) does not. It is important 
to note that the order in which the subjects received the two phases 
was random, and there was a decay period141 between phases of  
several weeks. 
 This multiphase design is important for a couple of reasons. First, 
it allows within subjects analysis for certain measures. Rather than 
having to divine what a hypothetical individual might do when he or 
she encounters law from a comparison of the behavior of a law group 
and baseline group, we are able to track how individual subjects 
respond to law as they encounter each phase. This connects with the 
second benefit: this experimental model provides an ideological 
baseline and outcome for each subject. In other words, we get a 
reliable indicator of how subjects would decide a case and how they 
would feel when judging a particular case without law guiding their 
actions. As a result, there is no need to use proxies to identify the 
pre-existing ideology of a judge, which suffers from at least two 
defects. First, if the proxy is exogenous—as it ought to be—then it 
might not be reliable indicator of the judge’s particular ideology. 
Second, even if it is representative of the judge’s ideology in most 
instances, it risks failing to approximate the judge’s ideology with 
respect to the facts of the case being analyzed. My methodology 
eliminates these weaknesses by providing the subject’s baseline 
outcome and a quantitative measure of his or her conviction with 
respect to the exact issue analyzed. 
 Turning now to the details, I will draw a quick sketch of the 
experiment’s two phases. A truncated and combined version of the 
experiment script is included in the Appendix. It will be easiest first 
to discuss what is held constant across the two phases and then to 
discuss the differences.  
 2.   The Elements Held Constant Across Phases 
 The essential constants were the fact pattern of the case, the 
questions posed to the subjects, and the incentives structure.  
 The Facts of the Case: I presented subjects in both phases with the 
same fact pattern:  
 141.  The decay period, which was simply the amount of time between phases, was 
designed to be just long enough that the students would forget the details of  
their decisionmaking in their first phases, but not so long that we risked them changing 
their ideologies.  
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A citizen of a foreign nation ("the alien") has legally entered 
our country on August 1, 2007 with a valid one-year work 
visa issued that same day. He fled his home country after 
being persecuted for his activism on behalf of the poor and 
his anti-establishment political opinion. He had been 
imprisoned for his political protests briefly in 2006, and he 
and his family had been threatened by the local police force. 
Worried for his personal safety, he obtained the visa and 
arrived here. He could not speak English and was largely 
ignorant of our laws regarding asylum, which is the 
mechanism our country uses to allow aliens to reside here 
who have been or fear being persecuted on account of their 
race, religion, nationality, membership in a social group, or 
political opinion. He began working in a restaurant shortly 
after his arrival, but his employer never asked him to show 
documentation indicating that he was a legal worker. He 
was paid under-the-table. On July 31, 2008, his visa expired. 
He continued to work at the restaurant, however, receiving 
pay as usual for the next 13 months. At that point, a new 
employee began work at the same restaurant. The new 
employee soon learned of the alien's experiences in his home 
country and of his expired one-year visa. The new employee 
explained to the alien that staying here after the expiration 
of the visa was illegal but that he might qualify for asylum 
on the ground of past persecution for political opinion. She 
suggested that the alien file a petition for asylum. The alien 
retained a lawyer and filed a petition about 4 weeks later on 
September 25, 2009. If granted asylum, the alien will have 
the legal right to live here indefinitely. If denied asylum, he 
will be removed from our country and transported back to 
the country of his citizenship. 
 The Collected Data (Dependent Variables): Having reviewed the 
facts, the subjects were then asked a series of questions from which I  
collected data. 
First, subjects were asked to decide whether or not to grant 
asylum (although, as described below, the role that the subject plays 
is different between phases). This provides both baseline values (in 
the baseline phase) and experimental values (in the law phase) from 
which we can draw comparisons and determine whether subjects 
have been constrained by law: subjects that choose different 
outcomes in the two phases (so long as the decision in the law phase 
is the one that the law calls for) have been constrained142 by law.  
 142.  More specifically, this is complete constraint. See supra Part III.A.2. 
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Having made their decisions, I then ask them to note the strength 
of their conviction that their answer was “the right thing to do” on a 
numbered, 0-10 scale.143 This measure (hereinafter “conviction”) gives 
us the ability to analyze a number of things. In the baseline phase, it 
provides important baseline measures, allowing us to know with 
some precision the intensity of their desire to reach outcomes that 
are at odds with the legal directive, which further indicates whether 
they will be likely to engage in work to get around the law. By 
comparing the baseline and law phases, we are able to learn whether 
the law has had a legitimating or delegitimating effect, depending on 
whether the subject’s conviction is higher or lower, respectively, in 
the law phase for those that were completely constrained. 
 Lastly, I asked them to write a justification for their decision. This 
aspect of the research design allows resources variation to impact the 
subject’s decisions and convictions; it is the writing of the 
justification during the law phase that forces subjects to do work, 
which requires resources according to the hypotheses described 
below. Indeed, a big part of the accountability of judges comes from 
the fact that they are expected to provide written justifications for 
their decisions; it is what makes work difficult. It also increases the 
realism of the simulation because it forces subjects to think through 
their opinions on the case, minimizing the likelihood of careless or 
random responses. Moreover, this design provides opportunities for 
content analysis of opinions in future papers, although this content 
was not analyzed here. Below, I describe the particulars of this 
dimension of the experiment. 
 The Incentives Structure: I designed the reward/penalty system for 
completion of the written justification to bring about potentially 
conflicting desires—(1) the desire faithfully to interpret the law and (2) 
the desire to bring about an ideologically satisfactory state of affairs.  
 As to the former, subjects were told that they would have the 
opportunity to be entered into a contingent lottery. The contingency 
was as follows: if subjects can convince one of two colleagues that 
they adequately justified their result, they are eligible to win a 
random drawing with a $300 prize. Subjects were told to write only 
until they feel they have written a convincing justification. 
Regardless of the phase of the experiment, this served to make sure 
that students were motivated to put in effort. Most importantly, 
however, when in the law phase, subjects will be motivated to write a 
decision that they feel is legally supported.  
 143.  Such scales, sometimes called “Likert-type Scales” are commonplace in behavioral 
experimentation. See Rensis Likert, A Technique for the Measurement of Attitudes, 140 . 
ARCHIVES OF PSYCH. 1, 1-55 (1932). 
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 As to the latter, I told subjects that their decision would result in 
the payment of $2 to actual charitable organizations whose mission 
was consistent with the result they choose. More specifically, I told 
them that a decision to grant asylum would result in payment to 
Grantmakers Concerned with Immigrants and Refugees, a non-profit 
and pro-immigration organization.144 On the other hand, a decision to 
deny asylum would result in a payment to the Federation for 
American Immigration Reform, a non-profit organization that is 
critical of current immigration policies.145 While these stakes are 
lower than if this case described a real immigration hearing, they are 
large enough for students to care about the real-world consequences 
of the decision that they are asked to make and therefore make the 
experiment more representative of actual judging.  
 3.   The Differences between the Phases 
 The primary difference between the law phase and the baseline 
phase is that the law phase contained a handful of elements that 
were not included in the above description. First, the law, as its name 
implies, contained a legal variable: subjects were given either a pure 
rule or a pure standard. Second, it contained a resources variable: 
subjects were given either a very strict time limit or no time limit at 
all. Whereas subjects in the baseline phase do not play a role (we 
want to learn what their personal preferences are), they are asked to 
serve as simulated judges in the law phase. It will be helpful to 
provide a bit more detail about the mechanics of the law phase.  
 The Legal Rule Condition: The subject under this condition is 
exposed to a bright-line legal rule. In particular, the rule provides a 
deadline for the filing of asylum after the expiration of the visa, 
which the immigrant has not met. A plain reading of the rule would 
permit a simple deductive solution—namely, all successful 
applications for asylum must file before the deadline, the immigrant 
here did not file before the deadline, therefore he is not a successful 
applicant. This is the outcome that would be produced by 
straightforward adjudication. Other outcomes would require indirect 
adjudication and therefore are more difficult to reach convincingly.  
As a result, the resource restriction described below should prevent 
some subjects from making otherwise preferable decisions. That is to 
say that it should take work.  
 The Legal Standard Condition: The subject under this condition is 
exposed to a pure standard. In particular, the standard requires that 
 144.  See GRANTMAKERS CONCERNED WITH IMMIGRANT & REFUGEES,
http://www.gcir.org/about (last visited Aug. 1, 2011). 
 145.  See FED’N FOR AM. IMMIGRATION REFORM, http://www.fairus.org/site/ 
PageNavigator/about/ (last visited Aug. 1, 2011). 
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immigrants file within a reasonable time after the expiration of the 
visa. Unlike the rule, it does not permit a simple deductive solution, 
and the lack of clarity should make it easy for the subject to decide as 
he or she prefers, which ought to be the same decision that he or she 
chose or will choose in the baseline phase. The subject should be able 
to reach the same decision in both the law and the baseline phases 
regardless of the resource restriction described below. 
 The Resources Limited Condition: Subjects under this condition 
must write their opinions in two minutes or less. Judging takes time, 
and engaging in judicial work even more so. Piloting revealed that 
the vast majority of subjects took over two minutes to complete their 
justifications. Accordingly, I set the resource limit at a time that 
would make it challenging for those who seek to engage in work to 
justify a decision that does not comply with a plain reading of the  
legal rule.  
 The Resources Unlimited Condition: Subjects under this condition 
have unlimited time to complete their legal opinions. In particular, 
they are told that they make take as long as they would like to write 
a convincing answer. 
 These conditions are combined together in the following two-by-
two matrix: 
 Rule Standard
No
Time 
Limit 
 Rule/Unlimited Standard/Unlimited 
Time 
Limit Rule/Limited Standard/Limited 
C.   How the Design Alleviates the Problems of the Existing  
Model of Legal Constraint 
 Having sketched out the basic mechanics of the experiment, it is 
now possible to explain how the design addresses the weaknesses of 
the existing model for legal constraint. 
 1.   Providing a Straightforward Legal Directive 
 Recall that one of criticisms of the dominant methodological 
approach to the empirical study of judging was that scholars do not 
often identify the straightforward146 legal outcome in the case before 
 146.  See discussion supra Part II. 
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each judge that they study, or even whether such an outcome exists 
at all. In that section, I argued that locating or utilizing simpler legal 
norms was one way to identify such outcomes without threatening  
scientific objectivity.  
 With that in mind, I adopted a framework that allows me to 
control the legal norms that apply to the cases that I study. In this 
study, the legal norms are paradigm examples of rules and 
standards. Thus, the rule is written so as to provide a facially obvious 
directive that interpreters can apply straightforwardly to the case 
before them. I designed the standard so as to provide the minimal 
amount of constraint possible without sacrificing its resemblance to 
actual laws. The rule sets a clear time limit for the filing of asylum 
applications, and the alien in this case missed that deadline by 
several months.147 Thus, a straightforward application of the rule 
would bar the grant of asylum. The standard, on the other hand, is 
included as a control condition to reproduce the results of the 
baseline phase. This means that the standard is not expected to have 
an effect—it is something of a legal placebo—so it will serve as a 
comparator for the rule, which we can understand as the true “legal” 
intervention under the Razian approach. Joseph Raz famously 
argues that laws with moral criteria are equivalent to asking people 
to do what they ought to do on the balance of all reasons; that is, it 
directs them to do what they would have done if there were no law on 
the issue.148 This norm content need not specifically be moral either. 
It could be any content that is merit-evaluative.149 Put differently, the 
content of the norm depends on the reasons for creating the norm in 
the first place; it is “content-dependent.”150
 The distinction between rules and standards tracks this 
principle.151 Rules generally do not force those interpreting them to 
 147.  It is important to be clear that I do not mean to equate “straightforward outcome” 
with legally correct or right outcome It is at least arguable that  moral requirements have 
been incorporated into all law through, say, invocations of equity or through the operation 
of natural law. From this vantage point, it could be that the moral and, therefore, legally 
correct outcome, is the one in which the alien is provided safe haven through asylum. 
 148.  While Raz takes this exclusive position regardless of whether the norm is a 
primary or secondary rule, some exclusive legal philosophers offer arguments that focus on 
the particular secondary rule of the rule of recognition. See generally Scott J. Shapiro, Law, 
Morality, and the Guidance of Conduct, 6 LEGAL THEORY 127 (2000). 
 149.  See John Gardner, Legal Positivism: 5½ Myths, 46 AM. J. JURIS. 199, 223 (2001). 
 150.  See Joseph Raz, The Relevance of Coherence, 72 B.U. L. REV. 273, 296 n.35 (1992). 
 151.  It tracks the distinction but not perfectly; the term “standard” is overinclusive for 
Raz’s category of content-dependent norms. There are standards that are more content-
independent than “do the moral thing” or “do justice” or “be reasonable,” all of which are 
basically equivalent to "make the best decision, all things considered" under the Raz model. 
Indeed, they are more so than the last three segments of the Fifth Amendment, all of which 
have been called standards despite having different, and increasing, levels of content-
dependence: “nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself,” 
“nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law;” “nor shall private 
property be taken for public use, without just compensation.” KERMIT ROOSEVELT III, THE
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reconsider the reasons that gave rise to their creation, providing 
independent and clear guidelines for dispute resolution. Recall the 
speed limit example. A judge that considers whether to impose a 
penalty based on the speed of an automobile is directed to exclude all 
reasons from her deliberation that were within the scope of the 
reasons for adopting the speed limit in the first place. She cannot 
consider whether the driving is more fun when it is done at excessive 
speeds or whether it might sometimes be safer to drive more quickly; 
such reasons were within the scope of consideration when the rule 
was enacted. This exclusion regulates her deliberation and makes it 
much easier for her to conclude that, because this driver exceeded the 
speed limit by 15 miles per hour, he deserves the legal fine. Now 
consider a legal standard. Imagine a law that tells all citizens to be 
“generally fair and equitable” in contractual relations. This norm 
directs subjects to resolve contractual disputes using the very 
reasons that they would have considered in deciding to follow that 
rule in the first place. The judge who carefully considers how to 
resolve a contractual dispute would presumably have considered 
those very reasons in the absence of law under the Razian view. The 
right thing to do on the balance of all reasons must itself be fair and 
equitable, so the law fails to do anything that would justify its 
insertion into the deliberation of the judge. It does as much work as a 
law that says, consider all the reasons that you would have  
considered anyway.152
 Because standards function such that there should be no 
difference between the results they produce and what an all-things-
considered determination would produce, standards have the power 
to serve as a control condition while analyzing rules. Standards 
should duplicate the results of the baseline phase of the experiment. 
In short, paradigm examples of rules and standards serve as 
                                                                                                                  
MYTH OF JUDICIAL ACTIVISM 31 (2006) (characterizing the first provision as a standard); 
Sanford Levinson, Some Reflections on the Posnerian Constitution, 56 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
39, 39 n.2 (1987) (characterizing the second provision as a standard). It could very well be 
the case that one or more of these provisions are content-independent under Raz’s 
understanding. Because the experiment described infra employs a norm for its standard 
condition that is clearly both a standard as well as content-dependent, we need not be 
concerned with this inaccuracy. 
 152. In their classic work, Hart and Sacks describe this very characteristic: “A 
standard may be defined broadly as a legal direction which can be applied only by making, 
in addition to a finding of what happened or is happening in the particular situation, a 
qualitative appraisal of those happenings in terms of their probable consequences, moral 
justification or other aspect of human experience.” HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M.
SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW
140 (1994). Kathleen Sullivan more recently defined standards in nearly identical terms, 
stating, “[a] legal directive is ‘standard’-like when it tends to collapse decisionmaking back 
into the direct application of the background principle or policy to a fact situation.” 
Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV.
22, 58 (1992). 
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independent variables in the experiment for the sake of allowing 
isolation of their differential constraining effect. Because the 
experiment exposes half of the subjects to rules and the other half to 
standards, it is capable of showing how these legal norm types cause 
different constraining behaviors.  
 Admittedly, one limitation of this study is that I am only testing 
rules and standards in a single case. Before any firm conclusions can 
be drawn about the differential constraining effect of rules and 
standards, at the very least a variety of cases ought to be tested. As 
explained, this was a good starting place. 
 2.   Reducing Problems of Strategic Behavioral Equivalence 
 Recall that existing studies on the relationship between resources 
and judging suffer from the fact that they do not have the ability to 
verify that voting counter-ideologically was the result of law 
constraining the voting judge rather than some other basis. Here, 
this problem of behavioral equivalence has been alleviated. First, 
many of the alternative strategic explanations for counter-ideological 
voting have been eliminated: there is no panel and the decision is 
one-shot, so the judge’s behavior cannot be explained using the 
typical institutionalist critiques. In short, the streamlined nature of 
the laboratory allows us to rule out alternative explanations based on 
the notion that the subject is acting in a way that is best for his or 
her ideological agenda in the long run. As a result, it becomes 
reasonable to conclude that a decision to choose the opposite outcome 
from the one preferred in the baseline phase represents a decision to 
be constrained by the law. 
 Moreover, we have the ability to screen out subjects that do not 
have strong enough passions to produce conflict under the rule, so we 
can be more confident that the counter-ideological voting we are 
seeing is hard-earned rather than the result of confusion, lack of 
effort, or changed ideological preferences between phases. For this 
reason, I screen out those under rules that did not have a conviction 
of five or higher in the baseline phase. 
 Likewise, we are able to rule out other behavioral equivalencies 
that are particularly problematic in the study of sharply limited 
resources. It might be worrisome that judges are voting ideologically 
because without adequate resources they become confused from the 
time pressure, thereby ignoring both law and ideology, and make 
decisions that are simply random. Of course, given the 
straightforwardness of the case and the fact that pilot testing 
revealed that the amount of time provided under the  
resources limited condition was enough to make an intentional 
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determination,153 this is quite unlikely. Nevertheless, by using 
standards as a control condition, we can rule out this possibility and 
provide evidence that the specificity of the legal directive in the rule 
or the resource condition, or the combination thereof, was the factor 
making a difference. In other words, we can provide further evidence 
that it is legal constraint doing the work.  
 3.   Providing a Measure of Legitimation through Conviction 
 One of the benefits of using behavioral experimentation is that it 
permits the adoption of new and improved dependent variables. As 
described above, I use a numbered scale to monitor the subject’s level 
of conviction that the result he or she reached was righteous under 
the different experimental conditions. The two-phase design allows 
us to see how the intervention of law changed their sense of 
righteousness. In this respect, the baseline phase provides a 
behavioral demonstration as well as a measure of intensity regarding 
the subjects’ views on the legitimacy of a specific state of affairs 
independent of dispositive law.154 In comparison, the law phase shows 
how that sense of legitimacy changes in the face of law. Using the 
measure of conviction in the law phase, we can see how subjects are 
more or less likely to reach outcomes under law that are different 
than what they would prefer under the baseline condition. Just as 
important, however, we also learn in the law condition how reaching 
either a law-guided or ideologically-guided resolution changes the 
subject’s conviction that she did the right thing in bringing about 
that outcome. As a result, we can identify the conditions under which 
following the dictates of law—even when they conflict with the 
judge’s ideology—actually increases the subject’s conviction in the 
result. This phenomenon must be understood as a legitimation effect.  
 Of particular importance to the study of limited resources, we can 
see whether limiting resources might affect judges’ motivation to 
follow and apply the law straightforwardly. A delegitimation effect 
might warn that judges will be less likely to follow their oaths of 
fidelity or might explain why judges are beginning to quit the job. 
D.   Hypotheses 
 Now that that basic mechanics of the experiment are clear, it is 
possible to articulate hypotheses. There are certainly more 
hypotheses than those included below, but those included are 
 153.  While the vast majority of subjects in the pilot who were unlimited in the time it 
would take them ended up taking longer than two minutes, many did not exceed that time 
by a large amount. See discussion supra Part III.B.3.  
 154. See Alan Hyde, The Concept of Legitimation in the Sociology of Law, 1983 WIS. L.
REV. 379, 426 (1983). 
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sufficient to highlight the primary indicators of legal constraint and 
to set forth the most essential predictions regarding the interaction 
between legal constraint and resources.  
 As a threshold matter, we expect that standards will produce 
results that are the same as those produced in the baseline phase, 
making them a suitable control condition. We will not see a 
significant difference between the decisions or the level of conviction  
under standards.155
 With respect to the interaction between rules and resources, the 
hypotheses are more specific. First, for the subjects with desires that 
permit conflict with the legal rule156 (that is, for those that support 
granting asylum in the baseline phase), we can expect that a higher 
proportion of subjects will change decisions to deny asylum under the 
rule when resources are limited than under all of the other 
conditions. With respect to conviction, we can expect that subjects 
under the rule will experience greater changes than those under the 
standard. The standard should do nothing to change conviction. 
Under the rule, there should be significant changes, and the direction 
of these changes should depend upon whether one was completely 
constrained by law or not. This term, “complete constraint” will be 
used often in the results and analysis sections, as will be some 
related terms, like “not completely constrained” and “partially 
constrained,” which are listed below in descending order of their use: 
 155.  As between rules and standards, I generally expect that the rules will exhibit 
constraining power on outcomes and the standards will not. But making basic hypotheses 
regarding how all judges under rules will compare to all judges under standards is not the 
goal here—this study is designed to test the interaction between the specificity of law and 
the availability of resources. Accordingly, I am most interested in seeing whether 
constraint is increased by cutting resources and how that constraint, or lack thereof, affects 
judges’ strengths of conviction. 
 156. There are a series of rule assistance-related hypotheses that could have been 
made, many of which are the inverse of the rule constraint-related hypotheses. Too few of 
the subjects tested supported denying asylum in the law phase to permit statistical testing. 
This comes as little surprise—there aren’t many conservatives in the Northeast. 
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Term Necessary Conditions 
Completely Constrained (1) Subject Granted Asylum in 
Baseline but (2) Denied Asylum 
in Law Phase 
Not Completely Constrained (1) Subject Granted Asylum in 
Baseline and (2) Granted Asylum 
in Law Phase 
Partially Constrained An indirect measure estimating 
the proportion of subjects that 
would likely have been completely 
constrained had they been subject 
to resource restriction, obtained 
by calculating the difference 
between the proportion of Not 
Completely Constrained Subjects 
in the Time Limited and Time 
Unlimited Rule Groups 
 Those subject to resource restriction who were not completely 
constrained (they decided to grant asylum in both the law and 
baseline phases) should experience higher drops under resource 
restriction than under no resource restriction on the theory that they 
were rushed and therefore not as confident that they reached the 
right outcome. Likewise, those subjects that were completely 
constrained and were subject to resource restriction ought to 
experience larger drops in their strengths of conviction than those 
who were not restricted. The difference here should be the most 
dramatic of all the comparisons, however, because of the possibility 
that resource unlimited subjects will experience a legitimation 
effect—an increase in conviction. They chose to side with a counter-
ideological result even though they had all the time that they would 
need to engage in work to get around the rule. In short, they had 
every opportunity to try to get around the rule but chose to follow it 
anyway. It is thus possible that they became more convinced of its 
merit. On the other hand, we can expect that those who were 
constrained and had their resources limited will experience 
considerably larger drops in their conviction than all other 
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combinations under the rule. They were given almost no opportunity 
to work around the rule, and this is likely to embitter them. As a 
result, it appears likely that there would be a pronounced  
delegitimation effect. 
 While these predictions might seem complicated, they are 
designed to reflect the principle that resource limitation will increase 
the constraining power of only those laws that have specific 
directives, but this increase in power has the cost of high 
delegitimation. Traditionally, it is useful for empirical papers to state 
a series of hypotheses written in the “null” format, making clear 
exactly the kind of statistical evidence that will disconfirm them. 
Anticipated results mean that the hypotheses live another day, 
potentially to be disconfirmed in future experiments. Here, the 
intended audience is broader than just empirical scholars, so the 
preceding discussion has been written in ordinary prose. To  
maintain precision, however, specific null hypotheses will be included 
before their relevant portion of the statistical analysis in the  
following section. 
IV.   RESULTS
 The number of subjects that completed both phases of the 
experiment totaled 132. Of those, only 10 chose to deny asylum in the 
baseline phase, and they were omitted because the rule would assist 
them rather than constrain them (they chose to deny asylum in the 
baseline). Lastly, a small portion of the subjects that were in the 
legally constrainable group did not exhibit strong enough conviction 
scores in the baseline phase to behave in a predictable fashion under 
the experimental conditions.157 This left 114 subjects for the  
remaining hypotheses.  
 Except where otherwise indicated, I performed a multiple analysis 
of variance test (MANOVA) with the independent variables of type of 
law (rule or standard) and type of time (limited or unlimited) and the 
dependent variables of law position, law conviction, baseline decision, 
baseline conviction, as well as change in decision and conviction. 
 The multivariate tests returned a significant result, so I continued 
to analyze the between-subjects effects. The main effect of the type of 
law—rule or standard—was significant with respect to the law phase 
decision F(1, 110) = 7.348, MSE = .903, p < .01. The main effect of 
type of time available—limited or unlimited—was significant with 
respect to law phase decision; F(1, 110) = 4.252, MSE = .522, p < .05; 
to law phase conviction F(1, 110) = 5.502, MSE = 29.518, p < .05;  
and change of conviction F(1, 110) = 7.427, MSE = 43.139, p <.001. 
 157.  See discussion supra Part II.C.2 (screening out those lower than 5). 
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The interaction between the two factors was significant with respect 
to law phase conviction F(1, 110) = 4.533, MSE = 24.318, p <.01. Post-
hoc analysis, using a Bonferroni correction factor, was conducted. 
These results are discussed in more detail below. Before considering 
them, it will be helpful to provide a summary of the most basic  
descriptive statistics: 
Treatment Percentage 
Completely 
Constrained  
(% Denying Asylum 
in Law Phase) 
Percentage Change 
in Strength of 
Conviction  
(Law Phase minus 
Baseline) 
Standard/Unlimited 
(N=22) 
0% .14
Standard/Limited 
(N=36) 
10% -.22
Rule/Unlimited 
(N=28) 
17% .43
Rule/Limited 
(N=28) 
32% -1.39
The tested hypotheses are numbered and italicized. 
1. For subjects in the standard group, a significant proportion of 
subjects will change their decisions between the two phases of  
the experiment. 
2. Subjects in the standard group will experience overall significant 
changes in their strengths of conviction between the phases of  
the experiment. 
 These hypotheses were disconfirmed. As predicted, there was no 
significant difference between the baseline phase and law phase 
measures of conviction (Table 1) or decision (Table 2) for the legal 
standards group. Nor was there a significant difference under the 
standard when comparing the decisions of the subjects between the  
two phases. 
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Table 1: 
Mean 
Strength of 
Conviction 
Stan. Dev. N Sig.
Standard 
Subjects 
under 
Baseline  
7.03 2.25 58 >.1
Standard 
Subjects 
under Law 
6.94 2.09 58
Table 2:   
 Mean Stan. Dev. N Sig.
Std. Delta 
Decision 
-6.9% .26 58 >.1
3. Subjects in the rule group will not experience changes in their 
strengths of conviction between the phases of the experiment. 
4. Subjects in the rule group will not experience higher changes in 
their strengths of conviction between the phases of the 
experiment than will subjects in the standard group. 
5. Subjects in the rule group who are completely constrained will not 
experience larger drops in their strength of conviction between 
the non-law phase and the law phase than subjects in the rule 
group who are not completely constrained.
These hypotheses could not be disconfirmed. With respect to strength 
of conviction, there was no significant difference between those that 
were under rules in the law phase and those that were under rules in 
the baseline phase (Table 3), between rules and standards (Table 3), 
and between those completely constrained under rules and those that 
were not (Table 3). 
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Table 3: 
 Mean Std. Dev. N Sig.
Baseline 
Strength of 
Conviction 
under Rule 
7.04 2.35 56 >.1
Law Strength 
of Conviction 
under Rule 
6.55 2.68 56 >.1
Type of Law Mean 
Change in 
Conviction 
Stan. Dev. N Sig.
Rule -.43 3.09 56
Standard -.09 1.83 58 >.1
Mean 
Change in 
Conviction 
Stan. Dev. N Sig.
Not 
Completely 
Constrained 
under Rule 
-0.24 2.08 41 >.1
Completely
Constrained 
under Rule 
-1.73 4.78 15
This is not particularly surprising. For the reasons discussed in Part 
III, differences in the direction and magnitude of conviction depend 
on the combination of whether one was subject to a rule and whether 
there was resource restriction.  
6.  For subjects in the rule group, subjects will not change their 
decisions between the two phases of the experiment. 
7. There will be no significant difference between the proportion of 
completely constrained subjects under the standard and the 
proportion under the rule. 
These hypotheses could not be disconfirmed, although the trends 
were in the anticipated directions. Indeed, rules completely 
constrained 20 percent more subjects than did standards (6.5% under 
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the standard and 26.8% under the rule). A higher number of subjects 
might have yielded significant results and, as discussed below, 
separating out the time limited subjects yields significant results. 
8. The subjects in the rule group under the time limit will not have a 
higher proportion of completely constrained subjects than  
the subjects in the standard group under no time limit  
(control group). 
9.  The subjects in the standard group under the time limit will have 
a different proportion of subjects that are completely 
constrained than the subjects in the standard group under no  
time limit. 
These hypotheses were disconfirmed. Critically, only subjects that 
were under both a rule and resource restriction showed significantly 
higher rates of complete constraint than the control group of subjects 
under the standard that did not have their time limited (Table 4). 
This finding parallels and builds upon the results in prior studies of 
the effect of resource restriction, which found that subjects exhibited 
more deference or independence when time was limited. The 
similarity to actual judge practice goes some distance toward allaying 
concerns that this simulated case lacks external validity. 
Furthermore, we can be confident that this difference is the result of 
legal constraint because we do not see this effect when a standard is 
substituted for the rule. Indeed, there was no significant difference in 
decisions between time-limited subjects and time-unlimited subjects 
under the standard (Table 5). 
Table 4: 
Group Percentage 
Completely 
Constrained  
N Sig.
Rule Limited  32% 28 .01
Standard 
Unlimited 
0% 22
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Table 5: 
Group Percentage 
Completely 
Constrained  
N Sig.
Standard 
Limited  
11% 36 >.1
Standard 
Unlimited 
0% 22
10. The subjects in the rule group under the time limit will not have a 
higher proportion of completely constrained subjects than the 
subjects in the rule group under no time limit. 
Interestingly, this hypothesis could not be disconfirmed, although its 
independent importance is lessened by the finding that only rules 
with time limitation differed from the control condition.  
11. Subjects in the rule group who are subject to a time limit will not 
exhibit larger drops in their strength of conviction between the 
non-law phase and the law phase than subjects in the rule 
group who are not subject to a time limit. 
12. Subjects in the standard group who are subject to a time limit will 
exhibit larger drops in their strength of conviction between the 
non-law phase and the law phase than subjects in the 
standard group who are not subject to a time limit.
These hypotheses have been disconfirmed. As predicted, those 
subjects that were under a combination of rules and time limitation 
experienced on average significantly larger drop in conviction in the 
law phase than subjects under rules that had unlimited time (Table 
6). Note that there was again no significant difference under the 
comparable standard control condition (Table 7).  
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Table 6: 
Group158 Mean 
Change in 
Conviction 
Std. Dev. N Sig.
Rule Limited  -1.39 3.17 28 .016
Rule 
Unlimited 
.43 2.77 28
Table 7:  
Group Mean Change 
in Conviction 
Std. Dev. N Sig.
Standard 
Limited 
-.22 1.71 36
Standard 
Unlimited 
.14 2.03 22 >.1
 Yet, even this data risks understating the size of the effect. If the 
results are further broken down to compare subjects that were 
completely constrained to those that were not, the difference grows 
even starker. Those that surrendered to the rule under the time limit 
saw a precipitous drop in their conviction of 4.3 points; whereas those 
who surrendered with no time limit saw a substantial increase in 
their conviction of 2.2 points. Because these subgroups are small, this 
finding is not statistically significant, but the trend is noteworthy. 
These findings support the conclusion that there is an interaction 
between the occurrence of complete constraint and resource limitation.  
V. ANALYSIS OF RESULTS
 Before moving on to policy implications and avenues for further 
study, it is necessary to discuss what these results mean. Generally 
speaking, the independent variables of legal norm-content type 
(introducing a rule or a standard) and of resource limitation type 
(limiting time or not) produced complimentary effects. 
 Rules and standards behave largely as we expect them to. While 
we might have expected a higher percentage of subjects to be 
constrained under rules, our intuition that only rules would, under 
 158.  To assist the reader, this measure already calculates the change in conviction. I 
noted earlier that the more traditional between subjects comparison also returned 
significant results. In this case the final conviction of Rule Limited (M = 5.61, SD = 2.77) 
was significantly different from that of Rule Unlimited (M = 7.5, SD = 2.27).  
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any circumstances, exhibit the ability completely to constrain 
subjects received empirical support. Under time limitation, rules 
appear to have forced a significant number of subjects to reach the 
decision called for in a straightforward application of the rule even 
though those subjects would have chosen otherwise in the absence of 
law. Likewise, the addition of resource limitation had a profound 
impact on the power of rules to change strengths of conviction but 
had little impact on standards. In short, resource limitation appears 
to make rules behave more like rules.  
A.   Threshold Findings: Rules Versus Standards, Generally 
 Recall that a unique dimension of this experiment is that it 
provided both (1) a methodology for distinguishing between 
constraining and non-constraining legal norms using a popular 
conceptual distinction and (2) empirical support for incorporating 
that distinction into statistical analysis of judicial decisions where 
possible. Recall further that the simplest account of rules and 
standards is that rules constrain and standards do not.  
 Looking at the results here, standards did not produce 
statistically significant differences on decisions or on strength of 
conviction. Rules159 fared a bit better, producing significant 
differences when assisted with time limitation. Even taking all of the 
rule groups together, rules completely constrained 20% more subjects 
than standards did (6.5% under the standard and 26.8% under the 
rule) although this did not reach significance. The following tables 
(Table 8 (Decision) and Table 9 (Conviction) detail these results: 
Table 8: Percentage Constrained by Subgroup 
 Time Unlimited Time Limited
Standard N = 22 
% Completely 
Constrained = 0 
N = 36
% Completely 
Constrained = 11 
Rule N = 28 
% Completely 
Constrained = 25 
N = 28
% Completely 
Constrained = 32 
 159. Hereinafter, the discussion of rules considers only constraining rules, as no testing 
occurred with respect to the rule assistance hypotheses.  
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Table 9: Changes in Conviction by Subgroup 
Time Unlimited Time Limited 
Standard N = 22 
Delta Conviction = .1364 
Std. Dev .= 2.03 
N = 36
Delta Conviction = -.2222 
Std. Dev. = 1.71 
Not Completely 
Constrained
Completely 
Constrained
Not 
Completely 
Constrained
Completely 
Constrained
N = 22 
Delta 
Conviction = 
.14
Std. Dev. = 2.03 
N = 0 N = 32
Delta 
Conviction = 
-.19
Std. Dev. = 
1.38
N = 4
Delta 
Conviction = 
-.50
Std. Dev. = 
3.79
Rule N = 28 
Delta Conviction = .43 
Std. Dev. = 2.77 
N =28
Delta Conviction = -1.39 
Std. Dev. = 3.17 
Not Completely 
Constrained 
Completely 
Constrained 
Not 
Completely 
Constrained
Completely 
Constrained
N = 22 
Delta Conviction =  
-.05
N = 6 
Delta 
Conviction 
= 2.17 
N = 19
Delta 
Conviction = 
0
N = 9
Delta 
Conviction = 
-4.33
A visualization of these results will make the differences  
more apparent. 
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 Likewise, the overall change in conviction was considerably 
greater under rules; it made almost no difference to standards but 
brought about a half point of change to those subject to rules (-.07 
under the standard and -.48 under the rule).  
2012]  JUDGING UNDER PRESSURE 983
 Generally speaking, then, subjects who thought that granting 
asylum was the right outcome despite the immigrant’s delayed filing 
continued to think so even after learning that the law limited asylum 
to those that filed within a “reasonable” amount of time. These 
findings support the notion that standards are, at best, a weak 
constraint on judges. It would, of course, be premature to conclude 
that adjudication under standards reduces to nothing more than an 
all-things-considered determination, as the views of Joseph Raz and 
other exclusive legal positivists would suggest.160 Some subjects, 
although a statistically insignificant number, changed their positions 
under the standard.161
 Whereas standards appear ineffectual, rules are certainly doing 
something: they do a relatively good job producing complete 
constraint. Yet, they do not correlate with statistically significant 
differences on conviction without additionally considering whether 
the subjects were constrained or whether they were subjected to  
resource limitation.  
B.   Advanced Findings: Decisions 
 Recall that I adopted the experimental intervention of time 
limitation to isolate the “work” that subjects engage in to get around 
a constraining rule. Since work requires resources, including time, 
restricting resources should reduce an individual subject’s ability to 
engage in work and, in turn, her ability to reach a convincing yet 
ideologically driven outcome. The results indeed show that the 
combination of limiting time and imposing a rule exhibited the most 
powerful constraint on our subjects. When we view the results 
together, showing both of our interventions (law and time) in action, 
it is apparent that our strongest combination—rule and time 
limitation—was the one that significantly constrained subjects 
compared to the weakest group—standard and time unlimited. 
 160.  See discussion supra Part II.E.1. 
 161.  It might be tempting to write off these outlying judges on the suspicion they 
independently changed their ideological position on immigration in the interim between 
phases or that they were simply confused. There is reason to doubt both of these 
explanations, however, and to believe instead that the standard itself was the source of the 
change. First, the judges did not have low conviction scores in either the baseline phase or 
the law phase; they felt almost as strongly about the righteousness of granting asylum as 
even those that stuck to their guns under the rule. Second, they were notably uniform; 
each of them maintained the exact same conviction throughout. This consistency suggests 
a lack of confusion.  
For some reason, these outlying judges appear to have interpreted the legal standard 
as a strong constraint on their ability to reach the ideologically favorable result. While 
further study of this behavior is necessary, it could very well be that there are judges that 
seek to be constrained by legal norms that most of us would consider weakly constraining 
or not constraining at all. Such people were not numerous enough to change the overall 
picture for standards, however.  
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Thirty-two percent of the subjects under the strongest combination 
changed positions while none of the subjects under the weakest  
combination did: 
It is notable that the other combinations trend as anticipated; the 
rule-unlimited condition produced about half of the completely 
constrained subjects as did the rule-limited condition, followed by the 
standard-limited condition at an even lower amount. But it is most 
important that the significant relation is the one between the 
strongest and weakest combinations (Rule/Limited vs. 
Standard/Unlimited). This supports the notion that resource 
limitation generally, and time limitation specifically, enhances the 
differences between the constraining power of rules and standards. 
 The finding that time limitation acts as a constraint enhancer in 
this context is important for several reasons. First, it lends empirical 
support to the account of constraint in which a considerable number 
of judges engage in work to get around the straightforward directives 
of law but require resources to do so successfully.162 This relates to a 
 162.  See discussion supra Part III.A.2. 
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second point: it provides evidence that partial constraint—a 
phenomenon that has been ignored by previous studies—can be 
turned into complete constraint by controlling resources. Third, as 
mentioned, it parallels the findings of studies that used real court 
data to show resource restriction increases deference and 
independence, thus providing external validity to the design and 
implementation of this simulation. Lastly, it shows that the benefits 
of resource restriction depend on the specificity of the laws that the 
subjects interpret. We can speculate that the higher the proportion of 
standard-like laws before the judges in a court, the lower the impact 
of resource restriction will be on legal constraint. 
C.   Advanced Findings: Strength of Conviction,  
Legitimation and Delegitimation 
 The story for strength of conviction mirrors the story for 
decisions—specifically, it takes resource restriction for the 
rules/standards distinction to become meaningful. When looking at 
all of the rule subjects and all of the standard subjects together, the 
overall change in conviction trended higher under the rules as it 
made almost no difference under the standards (-.48 under the rule 
and -.07 under the standard), but this difference was not enough to  
be significant.  
 The statistically significant differences emerge, however, once we 
separate the subjects into their time limited and unlimited subgroups 
under each condition. The presence of time limitation correlated with 
a precipitous drop in strength of conviction with rule subjects (-1.39) 
compared to a moderate gain in conviction when it was not present 
(+.43). There was virtually no change in conviction under the 
standard regardless of whether time limitation was present. The 
following graph visualizes the relation: 
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 Why would the presence or absence of a strong time limit impact 
the subjects’ strength of conviction under the rule? The simplest 
explanation could be that it takes time to be convinced of the wisdom 
of the law’s position when that position is at odds with the subject’s 
baseline position. Without available time, the subjects are left to 
prefer their conflicting baseline position and, thus, experience a drop 
in conviction when they feel compelled to decide pursuant to the law’s  
facial directive.  
 Another possibility is that the subjects view the external 
restriction of their time to be something like a legal procedural rule. 
Understood in that way, the fairness of the time limit could influence 
the subjects’ sense of whether the legal system is procedurally just 
and, in turn, whether applying the law straightforwardly is 
satisfying. This explanation requires a bit of unpacking.  
 Numerous studies, many of which were coauthored by Tom Tyler, 
have shown that perceptions of procedural justice influence peoples’ 
sense that the authority operating within those procedures is 
legitimate.163 Their sense of legitimacy in turn influences their 
 163.  See, e.g., E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF 
PROCEDURAL JUSTICE (1988); JOHN THIBAUT & LAURENS WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE
(1975); TOM R. TYLER & STEVEN L. BLADER, COOPERATION IN GROUPS: PROCEDURAL
JUSTICE, SOCIAL IDENTITY, AND BEHAVIORAL ENGAGEMENT (2000); TOM R. TYLER ET AL.,
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willingness to obey the authority that has promulgated or 
maintained those procedures.164 For example, one such study found 
that the fairness of court procedures was the primary influence on 
peoples’ willingness to accept court decisions.165 The lesson of these 
studies is that a subject’s opinion of the procedural dimensions of law 
can influence how she responds to the content of the law.  
 Here, it could be that rule constrained subjects doubt the 
righteousness of the strong time limit on their decisionmaking, and 
this jaundices their view of the righteousness of the law that they 
must interpret. In other words, these subjects could be critical of the 
procedure under which they must operate, and this makes them 
more likely to doubt the legitimacy of content of the law that they 
have applied. On the other hand, those that are accorded unlimited 
time to complete their adjudication of the issues might consider that 
provision to be a supremely just procedural rule, so much so that 
they experience an increase in their conviction. The size of this 
legitimation effect is quite considerable, as the subjects feel that their 
decision under law was more righteous than even their own, 
conflicting decision without it. Perhaps because it must clear the 
hurdle of baseline preference, the effect under the time unlimited 
condition registered as half as powerful; the drop in strength of 
conviction under the time limit was two times greater than the 
increase under the time unlimited condition.  
 It might be wondered, however, why the time limit did not exhibit 
the same effect under standards. While Tyler and others did not 
consider the differential constraining power of rules and standards,166
it is easy to explain how only rules would have the power to affect 
senses of legal legitimacy with respect to a particular case of legal 
application. Here, the standard was a weak constraint on the 
subjects. And even if the subjects were not pleased that they were 
held to a strict time limit when applying the standard, it is possible 
that the standard simply did not have enough constraining power to 
force the subjects into decisions that they did not otherwise prefer. 
Thus, on this account, any perceived procedural injustice would not 
have had an influence on the subjects’ strengths of conviction.  
                                                                                                                  
SOCIAL JUSTICE IN A DIVERSE SOCIETY (1997); Steven L. Blader & Tom R. Tyler, How Can 
Theories of Organizational Justice Explain the Effects of Fairness?, in HANDBOOK OF 
ORGANIZATIONAL JUSTICE 329-54 (Jerald Greenberg & Jason A. Colquitt eds., 2005); Tom 
R. Tyler, The Psychology of Procedural Justice: A Test of the Group-Value Model, 57 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 830-38 (1989).  
 164.  See sources cited supra note 163. 
 165.  See TOM R. TYLER & YUEN J. HUO, TRUST IN THE LAW: ENCOURAGING PUBLIC 
COOPERATION WITH THE POLICE AND THE COURTS 55 (2002). 
 166. Cf. Yuval Feldman & Oren Perez, How Law Changes the Environmental Mind: An 
Experimental Study of the Effect of Legal Norms on Moral Perceptions and Civic 
Enforcement, 36 J.L. & SOC’Y 501, 502 (2009) (considering similar issues and testing 
different norm mechanisms such as standards vs. market-based instruments). 
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 The support for this reasoning becomes more apparent when we 
distinguish between those subjects that successfully worked around 
the rule and those that did not. This distinction between completely 
constrained subjects and other subjects is appropriate because those 
in the former group are indicating their strengths of conviction as to 
two different outcomes across the two phases whereas those in the 
latter group are indicating their strengths of conviction as to only one 
outcome across the two phases. For those that followed the law, as 
predicted, a constraining rule correlated with a significant overall drop 
in strength of conviction.167 Moreover, a subject’s decision to submit to 
the rule or not also impacted whether she experienced a drop in her 
conviction. The graph below helps make these differences vivid:  
 167. Though we have heretofore been considering legal constraint, this effect is even 
more pronounced if we include legally assisted subjects in the analysis—the subjects that 
favored a denial of asylum in the baseline phase and therefore would favor a rule like the 
one provided. All ten legally assisted subjects continued to deny asylum when given the 
rule. Thus, simply knowing how the judges ruled in the baseline phase would allow correct 
prediction of the outcome under the legal rule about 79% of the time. Furthermore, 
whereas those subject to constraining legal rules experienced an overall drop in conviction, 
those subject to legally assisting rules saw a considerable increase in their conviction (+.9). 
Unfortunately, a lack of ideological diversity in the subject pool made it difficult to find 
statistically significant findings with respect to legal assistance; there just weren’t that 
many that wanted to deny asylum in the baseline phase. While the numbers are too small 
to be reliable, the trends are nevertheless consistent with the hypotheses. 
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Note that the bars under the standard condition are nearly identical 
to each other; whereas the bars under the rules are vastly different in 
both size and direction depending on whether the subject was 
constrained and was under time limitation. Indeed, those that were 
completely constrained experienced the strongest effects.  
 Moreover, this reasoning would further explain why those that 
were subject to the time limit but did not surrender to the rule saw 
no drop in strength of conviction. Upon seeing that they were subject 
to the limit, the same resentment might have occurred, but the 
subjects chose not to follow the straightforward dictate of the law and 
therefore did not need to question the righteousness of the outcome.168
 Skeptics might argue that the best explanation is much more 
banal—namely, that subjects had lower strength of conviction under 
the time limit because it forced them to rush and they were therefore 
less confident that they reached the right result. There are three 
reasons to doubt this explanation, however: (1) we do not see the drop 
in strength of conviction with those subjects that were under the time 
limit and a standard; (2) we do not see the same drop in conviction 
with those subjects that did not surrender to the rule and were 
subject to the time limit; and (3) subjects were not asked to indicate 
on the Likert scale their confidence that they reached the right result 
but rather whether the result was right, all-things-considered.  
 Now that we have a better sense of how the type of legal norm-
content, judicial ideology, and the limitation of resources interact, we 
are ready to turn to the question of how these results might inform 
policy and avenues for future research. 
VI.   POLICY IMPLICATIONS: MAXIMIZING DESIRED CASE 
OUTCOMES AND ITS RISKS
 The findings of this study tell us something about how to 
maximize the likelihood that judges will interpret legal norms in a 
way that is consistent with the dictates of a legal norm. Thus, these 
results ought to be of particular interest to those who legislate for 
and control the workloads of judges, with the proviso, of course, that 
further study is necessary. 
 168.  Under this account, we would expect to see a similar, corresponding increase in 
satisfaction among subjects who were legally assisted by the law. They too followed the law 
and were presumably impressed with its wisdom. We do—their scores went up by nearly 
an entire point, and they were the only other subjects in the experiment that exhibited an 
increase. The number of conservatively-minded subjects was so low, however, that the 
increase did not reach significance. 
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A.   Basic Legislative Guidelines 
 The results of this study concern two legislative tools—the choice 
of the specificity of law and the choice to modify judicial resources. It 
also considered two important consequences—case outcomes and the 
strength of judges’ convictions that they have reached the right 
outcome. At both the federal and state level, the legislative, 
executive, and judicial branches wield these tools: they can 
promulgate legal norms, controlling initially whether they are in the 
form of rules or standards, and they each exercise some control over 
the amount and dissemination of resources to judges. Legislatures 
and executive branches often have control over court budget and 
jurisdiction, which can impact the size of any individual judge’s 
docket load. Judicial branches exercise similar controls, although to a 
lesser extent. They can promulgate rules and standards through case 
law, and they can limit or expand docket loads by doing such things 
as implementing more or less restrictive appellate review policies, 
issuing more or less dismissals, issuing more or fewer unpublished 
decisions, and shifting workloads among individual judges. 
Furthermore, each group cares about case outcomes.169 Even though 
there is overlap in the goals of the three major players, there are 
important conflicts in this particular context. Those parties that seek 
to control the courts from the outside would likely seek maximum 
control over court decisions at minimum costs. Courts would likely 
seek maximum freedom over their decisions with maximum 
resources. The findings here provide general guidelines for the use of 
these tools to maximize desired case outcomes, but we must  
also consider how the implementation of these guidelines will  
likely produce a shifting give and take between legal constraint  
and resources.   
 The results here support the notion that rules constrain better 
than do standards. Because standards allow judges to reach the 
result they prefer, and in a manner of their choosing, the 
implementation effectively delegates to the judge the opportunity to 
take over the legislative function of supplementing the norm with 
rule-like content. Assuming that promulgating a rule is the same 
price as promulgating a standard, 170 and the legislators feel confident 
 169.  While it is less clear that both legislators and judges care about judges’ 
perceptions of righteousness, they certainly care about them insofar as they impact  
case outcomes. 
 170.  If we assume, however, as some economists do, that a rule is more expensive to 
promulgate than a standard—as the cost of fleshing out the norm falls on the judiciary—
then a rule should only be employed when there is a payoff to outweigh the cost of 
promulgation. See Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE 
L.J. 557, 621-22 (1992) (“If behavior subject to the law is infrequent, however, standards 
are likely to be preferable. . . . Determining the appropriate content of the law for all such 
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that they can draft a pure rule that calls for clear, desired outcomes, 
then legislators will likely prefer to promulgate rules under those 
circumstances where there is a fear that the judges might be 
ideologically predisposed to make decisions that are at odds with 
what the legislature wants.  
 The results further justify a legislative concern that ideologically 
motivated judges will make efforts to “work” around the rules they 
promulgate. Thus, the legislature will likely be interested in ways to 
enhance the constraining power of their rules. One way to do this, 
our results suggest, is to limit the resources that judges have to 
adjudicate. This strategy is doubly tantalizing because the legislature 
might have an independent interest in cutting the budget as much as 
possible. In short, they might be able to achieve more with less. Let 
us call this the “aggressive approach.” 
 The aggressive approach is perilous, however. In this study, 
judges that complied with the rule under a time limit suffered a 
precipitous drop in their strengths of conviction that they reached a 
righteous result.  Were such a drop to occur across the judiciary, 
there could be an overall increase in judge dissatisfaction, 
unhappiness, sloppiness, or worse.  
 At the outset, it bears mentioning that there are plenty of reasons 
why limiting judicial resources is a risky policy. It could threaten 
judges’ ability to meet the interests of justice by making them more 
likely to commit reasoning or fact-finding errors, for example.171 If too 
aggressive, it might actually increase erroneous interpretation of law. 
Common sense (not to mention law school final exams) tells us that 
rushing through legal problems increases the likelihood of mistake, 
regardless of ideology or preference.  
 Another troubling possibility is that judges, as repeat players, will
eventually grow exhausted or resentful from feeling unsatisfied and, 
as a result, will become more likely to allow their personal ideology to 
dictate their decisions in spite of contrary legal directives. It could 
very well be the case that the combination of rules and resource 
limitation could bring about a risk of what could be described as a 
“catapult effect.” That combination might make laws more 
constraining, as if the legislature has shortened its leash on the 
judiciary. As a result, its laws are more likely to bring about the state 
of affairs that it desires, at least initially. We can forecast, however, 
that increasing the tension on judges in this manner could snap the 
leash, catapulting the judges in the opposite direction. The 
                                                                                                                  
contingencies would be expensive, and most of the expense would be wasted. It would be 
preferable to wait until particular circumstances arise.”). 
 171.  Cf. Harlon Leigh Dalton, Taking the Right to Appeal (More or Less) Seriously, 95 
YALE L.J. 62 (1985) (analyzing these concerns in the context of appeals of right). 
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delegitimation effect could reach a point where the judges have 
grown so embittered that they care even less about fidelity to law 
than they did before they were restricted, and as a result the judges 
are more likely to reach undesired outcomes than ever before. They 
are catapulted into activism.  
 A catapult effect is just one countervailing force; there are others. 
As mentioned, courts have defenses to resource restriction in their 
arsenal. For example, affected judges might be able to soften the blow 
of the resource restriction measure through avoidance tactics. They 
might shift cases in the docket to allow them to devote the most time 
to ideologically important cases, might delegate a higher proportion 
of unimportant cases to staff attorneys, might kick more unimportant 
cases on procedural grounds, might limit oral argument, etc.172 This 
is not to suggest that any limitation measure would be ineffectual. A 
time limitation or some similar measure would increase the cost of 
engaging in “work” such that an overall decline in judicial activism 
might be seen. But evasion tactics by courts could mitigate the effect, 
and it might take more than one measure to effectively and desirably 
limit the resources available to judges that would be inclined to  
do work. 
 The potentially good news for those that promulgate laws is that 
the combination of rules and unlimited time can produce a salutary 
legitimation effect. There is evidence that it made completely 
constrained legal interpreters feel more satisfied in the results of 
their cases than if they had been able to decide those cases without 
having the law as a guide! Assuming again that the law interpreters 
are repeat players, such as judges are, then this combination might 
have the effect of changing ideologies in the direction of the legal 
directives to which they are subject. Just as the limit appeared to 
sour time-limited subjects, the lack of a time limit on subjects under 
the same legal rule appeared to make them embrace the law. Over 
time and within the judiciary, this could impact the judge’s 
underlying ideology in favor of the content of the rule. It is unclear 
what amount of resources would be necessary in the real world to 
produce a comparable legitimation effect, but further study might 
provide some indication.  
 In a nutshell, then, there is support for the notion that 
implementing rules and resource limitation has the arguable payoff 
of increasing constraint, but it comes with the risk that constraint 
will return or dip below pre-implementation levels if significant 
delegitimation occurs. Implementing rules in an environment with 
ample resources, however, has a weaker initial payoff, but the payoff 
 172.  See Huang, supra note 16. 
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might grow over time due to increased legitimation, as it could create 
a sub-population of obedient, satisfied judges.  
B.   Limitations and Avenues for Further Study 
 Like those who have studied the relationship between resources 
and judging before me, I believe that further study on this issue is 
necessary before we draw any firm conclusions. Certain aspects of this 
study were narrowed to maximize isolation of certain factors, and this 
narrowing forced the omission of phenomena that might occur in a 
real-life legal system. In systems in which judicial decisions are given 
precedential effect, pure rules and standards can be difficult to find. 
Not only do many norms fall somewhere between the rule and 
standard poles,173 even initially polar rules and standards converge 
towards each other over time.174
 It is important to remember, however, that there are examples of 
pure rules and standards like those used here in actual legal 
systems, even if they mutate over time. And certainly the mutability 
of rules and standards has not prevented the rule/standard 
distinction from being widely heralded as useful and meaningful in a 
variety of contexts. It would be strange indeed for a study of rules 
and standards to employ weakened versions of each.  
 Moreover, this concern can be alleviated with a reminder of one of 
the primary purposes of this study. This is the first study to link the 
impact of resource restriction to a straightforward legal directive. As 
a result, I began with the clearest example of the rule/standard 
distinction in a considerably streamlined case. This allowed us to see 
not only that a relationship between constraint and resources exists, 
but also that the specificity of law matters. We risk overly scrupulous 
adherence to external validity when we ignore that the laboratory 
may be the best or only way to capture concept function.175 This is 
 173.  See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., “The Rule of Law” as a Concept in Constitutional 
Discourse, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 49 (1997) (“First, as is well recognized, ‘rules’ and 
‘standards’ do not so much define a dichotomy as reflect ranges along a continuum.”). 
 174. As Frederick Schauer has noted:  
When authorised to act in accordance with rules, rule-subjects will tend to 
convert rules into standards by employing a battery of rule-avoiding devices 
that serve to soften the hard edges of rules. . . . Conversely, the adaptive 
behaviour of rule-subjects when given a standard goes in the opposite direction. 
These rule-subjects, when given few rules in the rules-standards sense, will 
make them themselves, and apply them to their own allegedly discretionary 
behaviour, thus limiting significantly the case-sensitive discretion that it was 
the intention of the rule-maker to grant. 
Frederick Schauer, The Convergence of Rules and Standards, 2003 N.Z. L. REV. 303,  
312 (2003). 
 175.  Professor Douglas G. Mook advanced a similar justification even for experiments 
that utterly fail to satisfy external validity concerns. See, e.g., Douglas G. Mook, In Defense 
of External Invalidity, 38 AM. PSYCHOL. 379, 382 (1983) (“[External validity is of no concern 
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especially so when our intuitions about these concepts are already 
used to justify particular governmental decisions in the absence of 
rigorous empirical support, as is the case with the rules–standards 
distinction.176 I leave it to future studies to experiment further with 
the variability of specificity. Nevertheless, the results here are not to 
be haphazardly applied to those situations in which judges apply 
“standardized” rules or “rulified” standards, as are often found in 
systems of precedent.177
 Second, it is important to note that our judges were not 
professional judges—they were law students. They were not repeat 
players—they were asked to consider the facts on two separate 
occasions. And the record they considered was quite streamlined. 
These dimensions helped to isolate subject preferences, but it created 
an impediment to generalizability, particularly to judges that have 
extensive experience and expertise and make several factually and 
legally similar determinations within a system of precedent. In this 
way, then, this simulation is not particularly representative of the 
very best of our courts, such as the flagship appellate courts at the 
state and federal levels. It is much more representative of our worst 
courts. Indeed, that the facts of the simulation here bore the closest 
resemblance to our immigration courts or the Board of Immigration 
Appeals is no coincidence. “Quite simply, IJs in many instances do 
not understand the law. Extreme examples of such incompetence are 
not hard to find. . . . Credibility determinations are repeatedly found 
baseless . . . . The BIA, the administrative appellate unit of our 
immigration courts, is also roundly criticized for its incompetence."178
Moreover, these courts typically have short or incomplete records and 
inadequate argumentation.179 Most notably, the amount of time that 
immigration judges spend on each case is not much longer than the 
time spent by our time unlimited subjects, and the trend is 
downward. The Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse at 
Syracuse University recently released a report showing that the 
maximum amount of time that immigration judges could possibly 
spend on each of their cases if they are ever to complete the cases in 
                                                                                                                  
in at least four cases.] First, we may be asking whether something can happen, rather than 
whether it typically does happen. Second, our prediction may . . . specify something that 
ought to happen in the lab . . . . Third, we may demonstrate the power of a phenomenon by 
showing that it happens even under unnatural conditions that ought to preclude it. Finally, 
we may use the lab to produce conditions that have no counterpart in real life at all . . . . ” ). 
 176.  For example, courts have expressly considered even academic scholarship on rules 
and standards. See Adams v. Plaza Fin. Co., 168 F.3d 932, 939 (7th Cir. 1999) 
(Easterbrook, J., dissenting); Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 
1512, 1534 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (Newman, J., concurring), rev’d sub nom., 520 U.S. 17 (1997). 
 177.  See Schauer, supra note 94. 
 178.  Linda Kelly Hill, The Poetic Justice of Immigration, 42 IND. L. REV. 1, 4-6 (2009). 
 179.  See id.
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their backlog fell from 102 minutes to approximately 72 minutes in 
the ten-year period between 1999 and 2009.180
 And although my study leaves open the question of what would 
happen with repeated cases of this sort over a longer period of time, 
many judges face decisions that bear the features of one-shot 
decisionmaking at least periodically.181
 Finally, there are institutional dimensions of judging that do not 
figure prominently in this study. In that vein, further research of the 
phenomena seen here ought to examine whether they continue to 
appear in a variety of institutional settings, manipulating variables 
such as the known ideological composition of panel members, the 
collegiality of colleagues, or the decisions of lower courts that might 
affect them. Further experiments can change these variables to 
examine how contextual factors, such as resources, might affect more 
complex, strategic, ideologically driven behaviors. 
 Another opportunity for further study is to analyze the fragility of 
rules and standards. While this study intentionally used very clear 
examples of rules and standards, future studies could analyze how 
the increasing rulification of standards or the standardization of 
rules affects outcomes and conviction.  
 The results here showed that a particular resource limitation—
time—impacted the constraining power of rules, but it came at the 
cost of weakening conviction. It remains to be seen whether other 
types of resource limitation will produce these same effects. Of 
particular philosophical interest will be to further investigate the 
relationship between attitudes towards the content of the primary 
rules of a legal system and resource limitation, which can under certain 
circumstances be understood to be a secondary rule (particularly,  a rule 
of adjudication).182 This research could provide support for the notion 
that we actually conceive of the legal system as a union of primary and 
secondary rules, as H.L.A. Hart famously claimed.183
VII. CONCLUSION
 This study provides empirical evidence of a complex interaction 
between the amount of resources available to judges and the 
 180.  Case Backlogs in Immigration Courts Expand, Resulting Wait Times Grow, TRAC
IMMIGRATION (June 18, 2009), http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/208/. 
 181.  See Cass R. Sunstein et al., Predictably Incoherent Judgments, 54 STAN. L. REV.
1153, 1202-03 (2002) (“The most important implication of this phenomenon is that 
judgments in isolation will predictably produce incoherence from the standpoint of the very 
people asked to make those judgments. . . . The pattern of within-category coherence, and 
global incoherence, is a nearly inevitable product of adjudication that is defined by one-shot 
judgments; the same pattern is embedded in many domains of law and policy.”). 
 182.  H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 94-95 (2d ed. 1994); see also id. at 80-81.
 183.  See id. at 94-95.  
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likelihood that those judges will follow the straightforward dictates of 
the law. The interaction has three dimensions. First, decreasing the 
amount of available resources appears to have increased the 
likelihood that subjects in this experiment were completely 
constrained by the law to which they were subject. Second, this 
reduction of resources—in particular, time—also appears to have 
decreased the degree to which subjects believed that their decisions 
were righteous. This emotional response to resource reduction might 
be a red flag that limiting judicial resources would lead to job 
dissatisfaction and legal delegitimation. Lastly, for any of these 
interactions to occur, it appears that the law must be sufficiently 
rule-like. Vague laws, such as standards, do not appear to produce  
these results.  
 It bears mentioning that trends in the data suggest that providing 
judges with ample resources can produce large legitimation effects. 
Although there were not enough subjects to reach statistical 
significance in this regard, those subjects that were completely 
constrained under unlimited time felt that their legally guided 
decisions were even more righteous than the decisions they would 
make on their own in the absence of law.  
 In this era of austerity, those that control court budgets and 
personnel will likely be heartened by the finding that providing fewer 
resources to judges might, depending upon one’s view, improve 
judicial performance. They would be wise, however, to take into 
account the potential long-term costs of delegitimation and judge 
dissatisfaction before making cuts or leaving seats vacant.  
 Looking forward, exploring the multifaceted relationship between 
the law’s specificity, the judge’s conviction, and available judicial 
resources could be the key to understanding how to maximize the 
constraining power of law. These links might have gone undiscovered 
under the prevailing empirical methodology for the study of judicial 
decisionmaking. Fortunately, behavioral experimentation allowed 
them to come to the fore. 
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APPENDIX (EXPERIMENT FRAMEWORK)
INSTRUCTIONS184
[Bracketed material was not visible to subjects but is included here to 
illustrate where different experimental conditions appeared for 
different subject groups. There are minor discrepancies between the 
text included below and the experiment as it appeared  
to the subjects online, but this version gives an accurate sense of  
the mechanic.] 
 [This is the fact pattern that was given to all test subjects] 
 Assume that you live in a country very much like this one and you 
are asked to make a determination based on the following facts. You 
are an immigration judge sitting on a court known as the Superior 
Immigration Court. You are the first judge that has considered this 
case. Because you are a judge, you ARE expected to know the relevant 
laws of your system, which are provided. The facts are as follows: 
 A citizen of a foreign nation ("the alien") has legally entered our 
country on August 1, 2007 with a valid 1-year work visa issued that 
same day. He fled his home country after being persecuted for his 
activism on behalf of the poor and his anti-establishment political 
opinion. He had been imprisoned for his political protests briefly in 
2006, and he and his family had been threatened by the local police 
force. Worried for his personal safety, he obtained the visa and 
arrived here. He could not speak English and was largely ignorant of 
our laws regarding asylum, which is the mechanism our country uses 
to allow aliens to reside here who have been or fear being persecuted 
on account of their race, religion, nationality, membership in a social 
group, or political opinion. He began working in a restaurant shortly 
after his arrival, but his employer never asked him to show 
documentation indicating that he was a legal worker. He was paid 
under-the-table. On July 31, 2008, his visa expired. He continued to 
work at the restaurant, however, receiving pay as usual for the next 
13 months. At that point, a new employee began work at the same 
restaurant. The new employee soon learned of the alien's experiences 
in his home country and of his expired one-year visa. The new 
employee explained to the alien that staying here after the expiration 
of the visa was illegal but that he might qualify for asylum on the 
ground of past persecution for political opinion. She suggested that 
the alien file a petition for asylum. The alien retained a lawyer and 
 184.  It bears noting that this design received Institutional Review Board approval.  
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filed a petition about 4 weeks later on September 25, 2009. If granted 
asylum, the alien will have the legal right to live here indefinitely. If 
denied asylum, he will be removed from our country and transported 
back to the country of his citizenship. 
[In the non-law condition, the following appeared.] 
Given these facts and assuming that they are true, please answer the 
following questions: 
1. The alien’s asylum application should be (one of the following):  
___Granted  ___Denied 
2. On the scale below, indicate the strength of your conviction 
that your answer for question 1 is the right thing to do, all 
things considered (please circle one): 
  0-------1--------2-------3-------4-------5--------6-------7--------8------9-------10 
   (weakest)                            (strongest) 
[Button click here will bring up the following, which will be 
timed, giving them about two minutes to read it.] 
 In this section you will be asked to write a justification for  
your decision. 
 There is no time limit, so you may take as much time as you need. 
Nevertheless, your response time will be recorded, so we ask that you 
indicate in your response whether you have experienced technical 
difficulties that affected the amount of time that it took to complete 
the section. You may work for as long as it takes for you to write a 
convincing justification. Please do not feel the need to work beyond 
that point. When this disappears, the time will begin and a blank 
document will appear with the fact pattern at the top and within 
which you will write your justification. 
 There are no word or length limits of any kind. Your justification 
will be reviewed by two other individuals that have been selected by 
the designers of this experiment. These individuals will not be ____ 
Law Students. If you are able to convince at least one of these 
individuals that you have reached the right result, you will be 
entered into a lottery, the winner of which will receive $500. You will 
be contacted on _____ if you are the winner. In the event that you 
succeed in getting one or both of them to join you, your determination 
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will have real-world consequences: If you choose to justify a grant of 
asylum, $2 will be donated to the non-profit organization 
Grantmakers Concerned with Immigrants and Refugees, which, 
among other things “seeks to influence the philanthropic field to 
advance the contributions and address the needs of the world's 
growing and increasingly diverse immigrant and refugee 
populations.” If you choose to justify a denial of asylum, $2 will be 
given to the non-profit organization the Federation for American 
Immigration Reform, which seeks, among other things, “to improve 
border security, to stop illegal immigration, and to promote 
immigration levels consistent with the national interest.” 
    __________________________ 
[In the law condition, the subjects randomly receive one of 
the following two options.] 
On June 1, 2007, two months before the citizen arrived and was 
granted a visa, the country enacted its first set of immigration laws. 
Among them was the following: 
Sec. 1:02:  
[Version A.1: Aliens seeking asylum must file their petitions no 
later than 6 months after the day upon which their work  
visas expire.] 
[Version A.2: Aliens seeking asylum must file their petitions within 
a reasonable time after the expiration of their work visas.] 
 Because the law is so new, there have been no cases brought by 
the government pursuant to it. It is acceptable for courts to base 
their decisions upon the laws, policies, purposes, or principles of 
other jurisdictions, although that is ordinarily viewed as secondary 
authority and, therefore, is not strictly binding.  
Given these facts and assuming that they are true, please answer the  
following questions: 
1. The alien’s asylum application should be (one of the following):  
___Granted  ___Denied 
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2. On the scale below, indicate the strength of your conviction 
that your answer for question 1 is the right thing to do, all  
things considered: 
  0-------1--------2-------3-------4-------5--------6-------7--------8------9-------10 
   (weakest)                          (strongest)   
[Button click here will bring up the following, which will be 
timed, giving them about two minutes to read it.] 
In this section you will be asked to write a legal opinion supporting  
your decision. 
[Version B.1: There is no time limit, so you may take as much time 
as you need. Nevertheless, your response time will be recorded, so we 
ask that you indicate in your response whether you have experienced 
technical difficulties that affected the amount of time that it took to 
complete the section. You may work for as long as it takes for you to 
write a convincing opinion. Please do not feel the need to work 
beyond that point. When this disappears, the time will begin, and a 
blank document will appear with the fact pattern at the top and 
within which you will write your opinion.]  
[Version B.2: There is a strict time limit of 2 minutes for you to 
write this opinion. Please indicate in your response whether you 
experience technical difficulties during that time. When this 
disappears, the time will begin, and a blank document will appear 
with the fact pattern at the top and within which you will write  
your opinion.]  
 There are no word or length limits of any kind. Your legal opinion 
will be reviewed by the two other judges on your panel that have 
been selected by the designers of this experiment. These judges will 
not be [redacted for privacy] Law Students, and they are not the 
same people that judged you last time. If you are able to convince at 
least one of the judges that you have reached the right result, you 
will be entered into a lottery, the winner of which will receive $500 (if 
you have already been selected for the lottery in round one, then 
success here will double your chances of winning). You will be 
contacted on [date] if you are the winner. In the event that you 
succeed in getting one or both of them to join you, your determination 
will have real-world consequences: If you choose to justify a grant of 
asylum, $2 will be donated to the non-profit organization 
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Grantmakers Concerned with Immigrants and Refugees, which, 
among other things “seeks to influence the philanthropic field to 
advance the contributions and address the needs of the world's 
growing and increasingly diverse immigrant and refugee 
populations.” If you choose to justify a denial of asylum, $2 will be 
given to the non-profit organization the Federation for American 
Immigration Reform, which seeks, among other things, “to improve 
border security, to stop illegal immigration, and to promote 
immigration levels consistent with the national interest.” This will be 
done regardless of whether money was given to one of these 
organizations in the first round. 
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